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HOW SUPPRESSION OF GENDER NONCONFORMITY
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ABSTRACT
Despite limited growth in legal protections for transgender people,
dress and appearance are largely treated as unprotected matters of
personal preference. In response, lawyers and scholars argue that
dress and appearance are intimately connected to the expression of
identity. Nonetheless, courts have generally deferred to the govern-
ment’s proffered justifications for these laws.
This article refocuses on the government’s alleged interests in
regulating gender nonconformity. Using a First Amendment analysis,
the article reveals how seemingly neutral government interests are
used to single out conduct because it expresses messages of gender
nonconformity. This approach avoids impossible questions about the
subjective intent of the individual to express their identity.
Drawing on social constructionist theories of gender, this article
establishes that dress, appearance, and other behavior communicate
the social meaning of gender and should be understood as communi-
cative under the First Amendment. When the state singles out con-
duct because it expresses gender nonconformity, the state’s interests
are related to the suppression of a message. This violates freedom
of speech under the governing O’Brien doctrine. Testing the theory
against actual cases involving government employment, child custody,
and restroom access, the article recognizes legitimate government
interests in privacy, safety, and efficient workplace environments.
The article, however, argues that under present doctrine on freedom
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of speech, the government may not suppress gender nonconformity
as the means of achieving these ends.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH ARGUMENT FOR PROTECTING
GENDER NONCONFORMITY
A. Autonomy and Communication of Gender Nonconformity
B. Gender Nonconformity Is Expressive Conduct Under
Present Doctrine
1. Gender Nonconformity Is Communicative
2. Government Regulations of Gender Nonconformity
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CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
What does my choice to wear a dress or a suit communicate?
Should the government be able to regulate my choices about dress
and appearance? When the government regulates conduct in order
to suppress a message of gender nonconformity, it violates the
freedom of speech. Consider the following example.
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On February 2, 1974, police in a Cincinnati neighborhood ap-
proached Adams in a parking lot during an investigation of alleged
prostitution.1 Adams carried a purse and wore a blouse, brassiere,
women’s pants, wig, and earrings.2 After some conversation with the
officers, Adams prepared to leave the parking lot but was arrested
for “dressing for illegal or immoral purposes.” 3 The relevant city ordi-
nance prohibited any person from “appear[ing] in a dress or costume
not customarily worn by his or her sex.” 4
Adams was arrested because of how he dressed.5 In particular,
Adams was arrested because he dressed and presented himself as
a woman.6 Adams was not arrested merely because he disguised his
identity.7 The particular city ordinance did not prohibit all disguises.8
Adams was arrested because he wore particular clothes. Adams wore
clothes that communicated a gender. Adams wore clothes that both
he and the arresting officer understood as women’s clothes.
What makes these women’s clothes? Nothing physically prevents
men from wearing blouses, wigs, and earrings. These are not women’s
clothes because they fit only women’s bodies. Blouses, purses, wigs,
and earrings are women’s clothes because they communicate a mes-
sage of femininity.9 Social gender norms allow us to interpret these as
women’s clothes.10 Both Adams and the arresting officer understood
his clothing as communicating a message of gender nonconformity.11
Adams could only be arrested under this law for communicating gen-
der nonconformity. Adams’s arrest suppressed his communication
of a message.12
1. City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974) (holding
Cincinnati’s cross-dressing ordinance unconstitutional on vagueness grounds). I follow the
court opinion in using male pronouns. For the purposes of this argument, it does not matter
whether Adams self-identified as a male cross-dresser, a transgender woman, or other
gender identity.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The state does have an interest in regulating use of disguises in relation to crime.
See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp. 2d
583, 589 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that an “anti-mask” ordinance is constitutional when
limited based on the criminal intent of the mask-wearer).
8. See Adams, 330 N.E.2d at 464.
9. See infra Part I.B.1.
10. See infra Part I.A (presenting social constructionist theories of gender).
11. See Adams, 330 N.E.2d at 464.
12. The court dismissed the defendant’s claim that his “costume represented a philos-
ophy or ideal,” only explaining that he failed to provide any evidence supporting this claim.
Id. at 465. The court failed to consider how gender nonconformity is itself a philosophy
or ideal. Arguments that gender nonconformity is speech continue to face this challenge
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I use this example because cross-dressing laws vividly illustrate
how the state targets conduct in order to suppress a message of gen-
der nonconformity. Beginning in 1850, many states passed laws that
prohibited “appear[ing] . . . in a dress not belonging [to one’s] sex,”
“masquerading,” or appearing in “disguise.”13 The state understood
gender nonconformity as expressing a message of immorality and
indecency:14 the state was only concerned with cross-dressing be-
cause the conduct expressed a message.15
Most of these laws are no longer on the books, and the laws that
remain are rarely enforced.16 However, the state continues to pe-
nalize expressive conduct in order to suppress communication of
gender nonconformity.17 This article is not primarily about cross-
dressers. This is about transgender people,18 masculine women,
effeminate men, and anyone else who does not conform to gender
norms. I focus particularly on how state suppression of gender
nonconformity impacts trans rights, but much of my argument
would apply more broadly to all manners of gender expression.19
today. See infra Part I.B (arguing that gender nonconformity meets the requirements for
protecting conduct as speech).
13. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET
27 (1999) (emphasis omitted). Eskridge notes that even when states did not have specific
cross-dressing laws, police often used vagrancy laws to harass cross-dressers. See id. at
29–31; see also, e.g., People v. Archibald, 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835, 837 (App. Div. 1968)
(upholding conviction under vagrancy law).
14. See infra Part I.B.2 (arguing that the state regulates conduct that expresses a mes-
sage of gender nonconformity); see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 27–29 (discussing
use and enforcement of cross-dressing laws); I. Bennett Capers, Cross Dressing and the
Criminal, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 7–9 (2008) (a historical discussion of the states’ inter-
est in cross-dressing). Capers recognizes that some legislators may have been concerned
with women gaining some economic advantage, but he argues that concerns with morality
were more dominant. Id. at 9. Capers argues that the law today continues to use dress to
“police . . . boundaries of gender, class, and race.” Id. at 3. See also Jennifer Levi & Daniel
Redman, The Cross-Dressing Case for Bathroom Equality, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 133,
151–53 (2010) (discussing history and rationales for cross-dressing laws).
15. Sumptuary laws were originally used to prevent people from adopting dress styles
adopted by other social classes. Capers, supra note 14, at 7–8. Here, I am specifically re-
ferring to laws that targeted cross-dressing.
16. See SUSAN STRYKER, TRANSGENDER HISTORY 76, 83 (2008) (discussing decriminali-
zation of cross-dressing); ESKRIDGE, supra note 13, at 111 (also discussing decriminalization
of cross-dressing); Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 150–53 (discussing continued enforce-
ment patterns of cross-dressing laws). But see Galbreath v. City of Okla. City, No. CIV-11-
1336-HE (W.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2012) (order denying motion to dismiss), available at http://
law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/oklahoma/okwdce/5:2011cv01336/82249/22
(giving an example of a recent disorderly conduct arrest for cross-dressing).
17. See infra Part I.B.2.
18. Throughout most of this paper, I use the term “transgender” to include cross-
dressing and other forms of gender nonconformity. See infra Part I.A (defining transgender).
19. State enforcement of rigid gender norms also hurts intersexual people, but in ways
distinct from trans people. See JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY
2013] (NO) STATE INTERESTS IN REGULATING GENDER 191
How does the state suppress gender nonconformity? A Massa-
chusetts school required a transgender girl to dress as a boy;20 an
Illinois police department disciplined two male officers for wearing
earrings while off duty;21 a Washington court awarded child custody
to the mother because “[n]o one [knew]” how the child would under-
stand the natural father’s gender transition;22 and the Utah Transit
Authority prevented a transgender woman from using public women’s
restrooms while driving a bus.23 Transgender youth face discrimina-
tion in foster care;24 transgender prisoners are housed according to
their anatomical sex and denied hormones or other care;25 and many
states refuse to change sex on birth certificates without proof of gen-
der transition surgery.26
Courts and scholars typically address these issues of transgen-
der discrimination through the prisms of equal protection, due pro-
cess, and antidiscrimination law.27 Indeed, the economic, emotional,
physical, and other harms that transgender people suffer raise strong
equal protection and antidiscrimination concerns.28 Despite recog-
nizing the vital advances made under these approaches, some scholars
SEX MATTERS 97–106 (2012). Although intersexual advocates may benefit from my argu-
ments against state enforcement of gender, I do not discuss the specific concerns of the
intersexual movement here.
20. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *1 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch.
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
21. See Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1990).
22. See Magnuson v. Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
23. See Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
24. See, e.g., Doe v. Bell, 754 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847–48 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (challenging foster
facility’s refusal to allow transgender woman to wear skirts).
25. See SYLVIA RIVERA LAW PROJECT, “IT’S WAR IN HERE”: A REPORT ON THE TREAT-
MENT OF TRANSGENDER AND INTERSEX PEOPLE IN NEW YORK STATE MEN’S PRISONS (2007),
available at http://srlp.org/files/warinhere.pdf (discussing treatment of trans prisoners
in New York).
26. See Dean Spade, Compliance Is Gendered: Struggling for Gender Self-
Determination in a Hostile Economy, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS 217, 238 n.35 (Paisley
Currah et al. eds., 2006) (listing state laws requiring surgery to change gender des-
ignation on birth certificates).
27. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 308 (D.D.C. 2008) (protecting
transgender women under Title VII); Jennifer L. Levi & Bennet H. Klein, Pursuing
Protection for Transgender People Through Disability Laws, in TRANSGENDER RIGHTS
74, 75 (Paisley Currah et al. eds., 2006) (suggesting disability antidiscrimination law as
a venue to protect trans rights); Dylan Vade, Expanding Gender and Expanding the
Law: Toward a Social and Legal Conceptualization of Gender that is More Inclusive of
Transgender People, 11 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253, 295–97 (2005) (arguing that anti-
discrimination law inadequately protects transgender persons).
28. See JAIME M. GRANT ET AL., INJUSTICE AT EVERY TURN: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
TRANSGENDER DISCRIMINATION SURVEY 10 (2011), available at http://www.thetaskforce
.org/reports_and_research/ntds (detailing the many hardships faced by transgender indi-
viduals in all aspects of their lives).
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have begun to question the limits of identity and equality-based le-
gal theories to adequately protect performative elements of identity.29
Existing theories fit all legal protections for gender nonconformity
into a single model of transgender identity.30 The post-surgery male-
to-female transgender woman comes to represent all trans people.31
But what happens when someone’s identity does not neatly fit in
this mold? What about non-operative transgender men, masculine
transgender women, or slightly effeminate non-trans men? Their gen-
der nonconformity might not be protected under an identity-based
equal protection theory.
Building on this insight, I argue that freedom of speech should
prevent the government from regulating gender nonconformity.32
Although other models to protect transgender rights remain critical,
my argument moves beyond some of the limits of an identity model
by focusing on how the government regulates conduct to suppress
the communication of gender nonconformity.33 City of Cincinnati v.
Adams illustrates how cross-dressing ordinances target communi-
cation.34 Ultimately, I will argue that all cases where the government
penalizes gender nonconformity35 are similar to Adams: government
regulations seek to suppress messages of gender nonconformity.
My argument builds on the work of other legal scholars who have
argued that dress and appearance communicate core aspects of iden-
tity.36 Gowri Ramachandran, for example, suggests an independent
freedom of dress, based on concerns with dress and appearance as a
site of connection between personal and public identities.37 Similarly,
Catherine Fisk argues that worker dress should be protected on the
29. See, e.g., DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS
POLITICS, AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 79–93 (2011) (rejecting focus on “rights”); KENJI
YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS 182 (2006) (arguing
antidiscrimination law still requires people to “cover”); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture
and Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 629 (2005) (suggesting antidiscrimination law
enforces cultural biases).
30. See Vade, supra note 27, at 273–75 (suggesting the “Gender Galaxy,” a non-linear
interpretation of gender, as a more accurate representation of gender diversity).
31. See id. at 255–56.
32. See infra Part I.
33. Cf. Taylor Flynn, Instant (Gender) Messaging: Expression-Based Challenges to
State Enforcement of Gender Norms, 18 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 465, 468–75 (2009)
(arguing for freedom of speech as an additional strategy).
34. 330 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
35. Much of my argument would also apply to conduct that communicates traditional
gender norms, but I focus on how the state targets messages of gender nonconformity.
36. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 33, at 491–94 (focusing on how individuals use con-
duct to communicate gender).
37. Gowri Ramachandran, Freedom of Dress: State and Private Regulation of Clothing,
Hairstyle, Jewelry, Makeup, Tattoos, and Piercing, 66 MD. L. REV. 11, 14–15 (2006) (crit-
icizing the limits of equal protection challenges to dress codes).
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basis of privacy and autonomy.38 Although this scholarship estab-
lishes the critical role of appearance in building individual identity,
it does not consider how the state targets appearance based on the
message expressed. I move beyond the focus on the intentions of the
individuals who are regulated to argue that the state’s interest in
gender nonconformity is based on the message expressed.39
I begin this article by considering the relationship between gen-
der nonconformity and freedom of speech.40 In Part I, I argue that
state suppression of gender nonconformity violates core values under-
lying freedom of speech.41 We protect speech partially out of a con-
cern for autonomy and self-definition.42 I use gender theory to sketch
an understanding of gender as a social process of self-definition con-
sistent with the value of autonomy.43
I then turn to doctrinal tests to argue that gender nonconfor-
mity should be protected.44 Courts and scholars disagree over when
conduct should be protected as “speech,” but they agree that the
state should not be able to regulate conduct solely to suppress a
message expressed by that conduct.45 Starting from this premise, I
address two issues: first, how one’s appearance, dress, and other forms
of conduct communicate a message; and, second, when government
regulation of this conduct violates freedom of speech.46
Past scholarship has used performative theories of gender to
argue that individuals use dress, appearance, and other behavior to
constitute their identities.47 Conduct, however, does not become com-
municative merely because an individual intends to express some-
thing. Dress, appearance, and other conduct communicate gender
within a social context that defines some behavior as “masculine”
and other behavior as “feminine.” 48 When the state regulates gender
38. Her argument thus does not use freedom of speech but is similar to mine insofar
as it protects individual expression instead of relying on equal protection. See Catherine
L. Fisk, Privacy, Power, and Humiliation at Work: Re-Examining Appearance Regulation
as an Invasion of Privacy, 66 LA. L. REV. 1111, 1111 (2006).
39. See infra Part I.B.
40. See infra Part I.A.
41. See infra Part I.
42. See David S. Han, Autobiographical Lies and the First Amendment’s Protection
of Self-Defining Speech, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 72 (2012) (describing interest in self-
definition as part of the broader autonomy value of free speech).
43. See infra Part I.A.
44. See infra Part I.B.
45. See infra Part I.B.1.
46. See infra Part I.B.2.
47. See infra note 114.
48. I make this point by connecting social constructionist theories of gender to the
use of communication theory in free speech scholarship. See infra notes 148–59 and ac-
companying text.
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nonconformity, it is not merely regulating conduct. By singling out
dress and appearance that deviates from these gender norms, the
state suppresses communication of gender nonconformity.49 I argue
that under the O’Brien test, courts should consider the means and
not just the ends of government action in determining if the action
suppresses communication.50
At the end of this theoretical discussion, I turn briefly to the
strategic question of whether antidiscrimination law is more appro-
priate than freedom of speech for protecting transgender rights.51
Even if state regulation of gender might violate freedom of speech,
is it worth pursuing the argument in court? I start by arguing that
present law inadequately protects transgender rights.52 In the pro-
cess, I illustrate how present law reinforces notions of the gender
binary.53 Cases built on a free speech theory can complement anti-
discrimination law, emphasizing the relationship between identity
and appearance.54
In Part II, I test and refine my argument by applying it to govern-
ment employment, child custody, and restroom access.55 I use actual
cases to support my contention that the government regulates con-
duct in order to suppress communication of gender nonconformity.56
Freedom of speech would not protect transgender rights in every case,
but this Part illustrates that it is a viable theory in a wide range of
cases.57 This discussion also allows me to consider strategic chal-
lenges to using freedom of speech in different areas of law.
In this paper, I use “gender nonconformity” to refer to any con-
duct that does not follow expected gender-based social conventions.58
I use transgender in a similarly broad fashion, to refer to anyone
“whose gender identity or expression is different than the gender
they were assigned at birth or different than the stereotypes that go
with that gender. This includes people who identify as MTF (male-
to-female), FTM (female-to-male), butch, genderqueer, tranny, trans-
sexual, sissy boy, etc.” 59 Cisgender refers to people who identify with
49. See infra notes 99–130 and accompanying text (arguing that the state suppresses
conduct that expresses dissent from a gender binary).
50. See infra notes 203–15 and accompanying text.
51. See infra Part I.D.
52. See infra Part I.D.
53. See infra Part I.D.
54. See infra Part I.D.
55. See infra Parts II.A.2, II.B.2, II.C.2.
56. See infra Parts II.A, II.B, & II.C.
57. See infra Part II.A, II.B, & II.C.
58. See infra Part I.A (further discussing what it means for conduct to communicate
gender).
59. See TRANSGENDER LAW CENTER, PEEING IN PEACE: A RESOURCE GUIDE FOR TRANS-
GENDER ACTIVISTS AND ALLIES 2 (2005), available at http://www.transgenderlawcenter
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the sex that they were assigned to at birth. Thus, most people would
be cisgender men or women.60 When describing case law, I follow the
courts in using transsexual to refer to persons who desire or have
undergone surgery to transition from one gender to the other. I also
try to use pronouns preferred by individuals when describing cases.
When it is not clear what pronouns a person used, I follow court
opinions in pronoun use.61
I. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH ARGUMENT FOR PROTECTING
GENDER NONCONFORMITY
The First Amendment generally only protects speech,62 but
courts have applied First Amendment scrutiny to some government
regulations of conduct: burning an American flag,63 wearing an ob-
scene jacket,64 protesting at military funerals,65 nude dancing,66 and
posting computer source code to the internet.67 These cases suggest
that First Amendment scrutiny is appropriate when the government
regulates conduct “because it has expressive elements.” 68
Like burning a flag, gender nonconformity communicates ideas
from one person to another. In particular, gender nonconformity com-
municates core elements of one’s identity and is related to the free
speech values of autonomy and self-realization.69 My key contribu-
tion is illustrating how the state singles out and suppresses conduct
because it communicates gender nonconformity, interfering with this
process of defining and expressing identity.70
.org/issues/public-accomodations/peeing-in-peace [hereinafter PEEING IN PEACE]; see also
STRYKER, supra note 16, at 1–30 (discussing history and politics behind some of these terms).
60. See STRYKER, supra note 16, at 22.
61. I do not like this option, as I recognize that courts may erase trans identities by de-
liberately using the wrong pronouns. See Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric:
Examining Transsexual and Judicial Identity, 34 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 329, 348–52
(1999). Unfortunately, for some cases I have no other information on what pronouns an
individual preferred.
62. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 7–10 (1982)
(defining an independent free speech principle to mean that government regulations of
speech are subject to greater scrutiny than similar regulations of conduct).
63. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989).
64. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971).
65. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1211 (2011).
66. “[N]ude dancing . . . falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s
protection.” City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (upholding restriction on
nude dancing as content-neutral regulation).
67. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 445, 449, 454–55 (2d Cir.
2001) (holding that software is speech, but still upholding injunction as content-neutral
restriction).
68. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406.
69. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982)
(defining self-realization as a core value of free speech).
70. See Han, supra note 42, at 72 (arguing for self-definition as a key part of autonomy).
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A. Autonomy and Communication of Gender Nonconformity
Before discussing how gender nonconformity is itself a message,
I consider why we protect freedom of speech at all. I use this inquiry
to support my argument that gender nonconformity is the kind of
conduct that freedom of speech should protect. Scholars focus on
three broad sets of values underlying free speech: democracy, truth,
and autonomy.71 Democracy is particularly privileged in much free
speech theory72 because free speech informs popular decision mak-
ing and sovereignty.73 Seemingly non-political speech plays a critical
role in this process of democratic decision making.74 For example,
seeing a trans person using the restroom may convince someone to
think about the importance of policies protecting restroom access.
Free speech is also highly valued based on an instrumental concern
with achieving truth.75 As Holmes famously argued, “the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market.” 76 Countless books and articles have been writ-
ten arguing that masculinity and femininity are not determined by
biological sex.77 However, seeing and interacting with a trans person
may do more than any written argument to convince someone to
change their assumptions about the relationship between sex and
gender.78 While democracy and truth support my argument, govern-
ment suppression of gender nonconformity particularly infringes on
the core free speech value of autonomy.
71. See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970);
Redish, supra note 69, at 591; see also Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 119, 130–41, 143–54 (1989) (grouping a larger set of ten justifications into
these three primary values).
72. See ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 23 (1st ed. 1985) (“[T]he argument from
democracy has been the most influential theory in the development of twentieth-century
free speech law.”).
73. See SCHAUER, supra note 62, at 36 (“[F]reedom of speech is crucial in providing
the sovereign electorate with the information it needs to exercise its sovereign power.”).
74. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1217 (2011) (holding that speech that “fall[s]
short of refined social or political commentary” is still protected); see also Eugene Volokh,
The Trouble with “Public Discourse” as a Limitation on Free Speech Rights, 97 VA. L.
REV. 567, 567, 591–94 (2011) (arguing against only protecting a narrow range of polit-
ical speech).
75. See SCHAUER, supra note 62, at 16 (“[All formulations of the value of truth]
share a belief that freedom of speech is not an end but a means . . . of identifying and
accepting truth.”).
76. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
77. See, e.g., ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, MYTHS OF GENDER: BIOLOGICAL THEORIES
ABOUT WOMEN AND MEN (2d ed. 1992).
78. Scanlon similarly argues that actual portrayals of sex may do more to change
people’s attitudes towards sex than written arguments. See T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom
of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519, 547 (1979).
2013] (NO) STATE INTERESTS IN REGULATING GENDER 197
Autonomy includes a core concern with freedom to choose how
we express our identity.79 We prevent the government from interfer-
ing with speech not only to enhance democracy or the marketplace
of truth, but also out of respect for autonomous self-expression. As
David Han explains, “speech holds intrinsic value apart from aiding
in the discovery of truth or promoting democratic self-governance: We
also speak in order to define, develop, and express ourselves as in-
dividuals.” 80 When a trans woman says “I am a woman,” she engages
this interest in self-definition. Similarly, when a trans man wears
a suit instead of a dress, he engages this interest in self-definition.
Our understanding of autonomy as a core free speech value should
extend to the self-definition inherent in gender nonconformity.81
Even when the Supreme Court does not explicitly rely on auton-
omy and self-expression as reasons to protect speech, these values are
implicit throughout the reasoning of its key free speech opinions.82
Most recently, in United States v. Alvarez,83 the Court protected Xavier
Alvarez’s right to publicly lie about receiving the Congressional Medal
of Honor. The Court focused on Alvarez’s individual interest in self-
expression rather than any values of democracy or truth.84 Justice
Breyer noted that “[f]alse factual statements can serve useful human
objectives, for example: in social contexts, where they may prevent
embarrassment, protect privacy, shield a person from prejudice, pro-
vide the sick with comfort, or preserve a child’s innocence.” 85 These
objectives all relate to an underlying interest in self-definition.
Alvarez was about speech and not conduct, but the Court’s con-
cern with protecting self-definition is also inherent in many decisions
involving conduct.86 In particular, the Court has noted the expres-
sive function of clothing. In Cohen v. California, Justice Harlan em-
phasized “that the Constitution leaves matters of taste and style . . .
to the individual.” 87 While Cohen’s jacket may have expressed political
79. See Redish, supra note 69, at 607, 623 (developing full meaning of self-realization
as related to autonomy).
80. Han, supra note 42, at 97–98 (defining interest in “self-definition”).
81. Cf. id. at 99 (arguing that self-definition is constitutionally based in autonomy).
82. See id. at 103–08 (discussing doctrinal basis of self-definition).
83. 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
84. See id. at 2551 (“Though few might find respondent’s statements anything but
contemptible, his right to make those statements is protected by the Constitution’s guar-
antee of freedom of speech and expression.”) (plurality opinion); id. at 2552 (noting that
lies may not contribute to marketplace of ideas) (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Han,
supra note 42, at 73, 97, 99, 103, 124–25, 128 (using Alvarez case as key example of why
interest in self-definition serves crucial independent First Amendment function).
85. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., concurring).
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573–74 (1974) (holding that wearing the
flag on the seat of a pair of jeans is constitutional).
87. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (protecting jacket with words “Fuck
the Draft”).
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dissent, the jacket also defined and expressed Cohen’s identity. Sim-
ilarly, in Tinker, the Court protected students’ black armbands.88
While the Court emphasized the political nature of the armbands, it
also noted the students’ interest in autonomy and self-expression.89
The Court also noticeably draws on the self-definition element
of autonomy in cases dealing with compelled speech and freedom
of association.90
These cases make it clear that free speech is not only about
democracy or truth. In Cohen, the opinion began by noting that the
case may seem trivial.91 In Alvarez, the Court suggested that lies did
not contribute much to democracy or truth.92 Yet the Court recog-
nized an autonomy value underlying speech in both cases.93 As much
as we recognize Paul Cohen’s autonomy when we protect his jacket,
we should recognize Pat Doe’s autonomy when we protect her skirts.94
I now turn to gender theory to briefly sketch out an understand-
ing of gender nonconformity as communicative. In doing so, I partic-
ularly emphasize the importance of autonomy and self-definition. By
focusing on this interest in autonomy and self-definition, I avoid claim-
ing that gender nonconformity is necessarily political.95 We should
protect gender nonconformity whether it is political or not.96
88. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504–06, 511, 514
(1969) (protecting armbands worn in protest of the Vietnam War).
89. Id. at 511 (“[Students] may not be confined to the expression of those senti-
ments that are officially approved . . . students are entitled to freedom of expression of
their views.”).
90. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 573 (1995) (emphasizing “that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the con-
tent of his own message” as his or her freedom of association); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (holding that state cannot compel an individual to be a “mobile bill-
board” for “an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable”); see also Han, supra note 42,
at 106–07 (discussing these cases).
91. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 15.
92. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 2550; Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26.
94. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4, *8 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton
Sch. Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000) (protect-
ing transgender girl’s clothing).
95. Rather, my point in discussing political values above is that gender nonconfor-
mity contributes to democratic decision making whether or not it is political. See Andrew
Koppelman, Madisonian Pornography or, the Importance of Jeffrey Sherman, 84 CHI.–
KENT L. REV. 597, 607, 609–10, 612–13 (2009) (arguing that non-political speech plays
a key role in furthering democracy).
96. See Steven J. Macias, Adolescent Identity Versus the First Amendment: Sexuality
and Speech Rights in the Public Schools, SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming, 2012) (raising
concern that expression of LGBT identity is politicized while expression of non-LGBT
identity is not). My focus on self-definition avoids Macias’s concern with equating iden-
tity and anti-identity speech as part of the same political discourse.
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In our society, we use gender as a central way to identify people:
male or female.97 We assume that we can reliably identify someone
as male or female based on his or her appearance.98 Our pronouns
depend on this, and we become uncomfortable when we cannot iden-
tify someone as male or female. Legal scholars describe this rigid
system as a “gender binary.” 99 In this view, sex is determined at birth
by some combination of biological factors and cannot be changed
later.100 All manner of dress and appearance is either “masculine”
or “feminine.”101 Men look and act certain ways because they are men.
Women look and act certain ways because they are women. We expect
that everyone will fall into these distinct categories.102
Gender theorists challenge the idea that there is any single cat-
egory of “women” or “men.”103 These scholars argue that gender is not
a fixed category.104 Women do not all think, look, or act alike. Instead,
these scholars describe gender as mutable and performative.105 Men
do not wear suits because they are men.106 Instead, when someone
wears a suit, they constitute their masculinity.107 We all constitute
our identities as men and women by our behavior, including dress,
hair, bodily movement, and speech.108
This means that masculinity does not only belong to male
bodies.109 One woman might speak softly, wear makeup and nail
polish, and prefer pink shirts. But another woman might shave her
head, lift weights, and tattoo her arms. These women are not merely
expressing personal style preferences. They are constituting their
97. See David B. Cruz, Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1055
(2002).
98. See Jillian Todd Weiss, The Gender Caste System: Identity, Privacy, and Hetero-
normativity, 10 L. & SEXUALITY: A REV. OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL
ISSUES 123, 179 (2001).
99. See Cruz, supra note 97, at 1009–11 (arguing that gender is an ideology that can
be compared to religious belief systems); Flynn, supra note 33, at 489 (suggesting trans
people express opposition to gender binary); Keller, supra note 61, at 339 (arguing that
a binary gender ideology shapes legal approaches to identifying transsexuals).
100. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 77, at 77–85 (discussing binary division of sex
and arguing that biologically it would be more accurate to consider at least five sexes).
101. See Weiss, supra note 98, at 179.
102. Jillian Weiss describes how this “normative principle” of gender completely erases
the existence of trans people. See id. at 124.
103. See, e.g., FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 77, at 88.
104. See, e.g., id.
105. Judith Butler’s work is considered the foundational text in this area. See JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 5–9 (1990).
106. See id.
107. See JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY 100 (1998).
108. See BUTLER, supra note 105, at 25 (“[I]dentity is performatively constituted by
the very ‘expressions’ that are said to be its results.”).
109. See HALBERSTAM, supra note 107, at 15 (studying how female-bodied people enact
masculinity).
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gender. They use their behavior to define themselves as more or less
feminine or masculine.110
Describing gender as performative does not mean that it is a
costume that we can take on and off at will.111 Unlike when we change
a costume, changing how we perform our gender involves redefining
our identity. By describing gender as performative, scholars focus
on this process of using conduct to define and express identity.112
For example, when Pat Doe began wearing dresses to school, she was
not merely trying out a new fashion style.113 She was defining her-
self as a girl. Through her conduct, she constituted her female iden-
tity. Legal scholars use performative theories of gender to argue that
gender expression forms a critical element of individual identity.114
Gender nonconformity is an act of self-definition, directly implicat-
ing the free speech value of autonomy.
Even if we recognize how important gender nonconformity may
be to trans people’s self-definition, we also need to consider whether
it is really speech. Gender nonconformity can only be protected un-
der the First Amendment if it is understood as communicative by
others.115 When we see a jacket protesting the draft,116 we under-
stand the message being communicated. Many people, however, do
not understand someone wearing a dress as communicating any mes-
sage. Most of us fail to “see” any message here. Social constructionist
theories of gender focus on how we internalize social norms that give
meaning to gender nonconformity and other gender conduct.117 These
norms allow us to see a dress as a marker of femininity.
Despite some biological differences, men and women are more
alike than different.118 From birth, we learn how to be boys and girls,
110. See, e.g., id. at 23.
111. See Weiss, supra note 98, at 159 (arguing that gender is not a costume).
112. See, e.g., id. at 160.
113. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch.
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
114. See, e.g., YOSHINO, supra note 29, at 70–71 (exploring relationship between per-
formative theories and lesbian and gay identity); David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive)
Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 319, 326–27 (1994); Janet E. Halley, The Politics
of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA
L. REV. 915, 945 (1989); Ramachandran, supra note 37, at 25 (exploring relationship be-
tween performative theories and appearance).
115. Gowri Ramachandran makes this point in defense of her decision to argue that
freedom of dress should be independent of free speech. See Ramachandran, supra note 37,
at 41.
116. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971).
117. See LAURA KRAMER, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION 55–57,
77 (3d ed. 2011) (overview of relevant theories).
118. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 77, at 7–8 (rejecting nature versus nurture
framework for sex differences, “arguing instead for a more complex analysis in which an
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men and women. Social norms tell us that men behave, dress, and
appear in certain ways, and women behave, dress, and appear in
different ways.119 For example, in the United States, we learn that
“boys don’t cry,” but girls are sensitive.120 We learn how to express
our gender consistent with social expectations of what we “should”
do because we are women or men.121 By the time we are old enough
to understand ourselves as boys and girls, this process of learning
is so ingrained that gender seems natural.122 We automatically un-
derstand some conduct as expressing masculinity and other conduct
as expressing femininity. This process of social learning masks how
much of our behavior and appearance is geared towards constantly
communicating our gender.123
Candace West and Don Zimmerman use social constructionist
theories to describe gender as being accomplished in everyday in-
teractions.124 This situates gender performativity in a social context:
individual gender performances are constantly evaluated against
norms defining how men and women should behave.125 Most of us
constantly use our behavior, mannerisms, appearance, speech, and
activities to prove that we are male or female.126 When our gender
performance “fails,” as when a man wears women’s jeans, we might be
held accountable by others questioning our performance.127 By wearing
individual’s capacities emerge from a web of interactions between the biological being
and the social environment.”); Janet Shibley Hyde, The Gender Similarities Hypothesis,
60 AM. PSYCHOL. 581, 581 (2005) (“The gender similarities hypothesis holds that males
and females are similar on most, but not all, psychological variables. That is, men and
women, as well as boys and girls, are more alike than they are different.”).
119. See BARRIE THORNE, GENDER PLAY: GIRLS AND BOYS IN SCHOOL 1–2, 91–95 (2d ed.
1994) (describing process of learning to perform gender with particular attention to role
of schools at a young age); see also ANN ARNETT FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS
IN THE MAKING OF BLACK MASCULINITY 85–88 (2000) (arguing that black males learn how
to perform a sort of deviant masculinity through their interactions with school officials
who label them as violent and deviant); MICHAEL KIMMEL, GUYLAND: THE PERILOUS WORLD
WHERE BOYS BECOME MEN 24–43 (2008) (examining how American males between the
ages of 16 and 26 learn how to be men).
120. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. KOTTLER, THE LANGUAGE OF TEARS 156–60 (1996) (dis-
cussing how males are conditioned not to cry, while females are encouraged to express
their feelings).
121. See Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing Gender, 1 GENDER & SOC’Y 125,
132 (1987).
122. See id. at 133 (discussing the categorization of individuals into genders).
123. Taylor Flynn refers to this masking as seeing “pink on pink.” Flynn, supra note 33,
at 500–02. She argues that because gender norms are so ubiquitous, we fail to see how
conduct is used to express gender: gender becomes invisible. Id.
124. West & Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 126 (“Doing gender involves a complex
of socially guided perceptual, interactional, and micropolitical activities that cast par-
ticular pursuits as expressions of masculine and feminine ‘natures.’ ”).
125. Id. While social construction theories of gender do not use the language of gender
performativity, I use it here to make the connection between these theories.
126. See BUTLER, supra note 105, at 134–41.
127. See id. at 134–37.
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a suit and tie, men avoid “failing” at their gender performance. Social
norms tell us that wearing a suit and tie is masculine.128 Because
gender structures our whole society, most people are not aware of
how they actively participate in communicating gender.129
I used this brief discussion of gender theory to challenge the idea
of gender as a fixed, static category. Individuals use dress, appearance,
and behavior in a social process of defining and communicating gen-
der identity.130 I turn now to building my doctrinal argument under
freedom of speech. Key to this argument is the idea that the state can-
not single out conduct because it expresses gender nonconformity.131
When the state suppresses gender nonconformity, it infringes on the
autonomy and self-definition values inherent in free speech.132
B. Gender Nonconformity Is Expressive Conduct Under
Present Doctrine
In Doe v. Yunits, the Superior Court of Massachusetts held that
a transgender girl’s clothing was protected speech and that she must
be allowed to present herself as a girl while at school.133 This opinion
supports my argument that gender nonconformity should be pro-
tected as speech. After Pat Doe began wearing “girls’ make-up,
shirts, and fashion accessories to school,” school staff “informed [her]
that she would not be allowed to attend [the school] if she were to
wear any outfits disruptive to the educational process, specifically
padded bras, skirts or dresses, or wigs.”134 While the court recog-
nized the school’s legitimate interest in maintaining an educational
environment, it held that the school district “meant to suppress
plaintiff’s speech.”135
As with Yunits, my argument hinges on how the government
regulates conduct in order to suppress gender nonconformity. Indi-
viduals use a nearly limitless array of behavior to perform gender,
but freedom of speech only prohibits regulating conduct because of
the message expressed.136 I begin with a lengthy discussion of why
128. See West & Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 126–27.
129. See MICHAEL S. KIMMEL, THE GENDERED SOCIETY 93–99, 112–13 (2d ed. 2004)
(explaining different sources of gender and how it constructs our whole society).
130. See BUTLER, supra note 105, at 136.
131. See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch.
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
132. See Han, supra note 42, at 106.
133. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3–5, *8.
134. Id. at *1–2.
135. Id. at *4.
136. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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gender nonconformity is communicative.137 This lays the ground-
work for understanding how the state singles out and suppresses
communication of gender nonconformity.
1. Gender Nonconformity Is Communicative
Following Spence v. Washington, the First Amendment protects
conduct when it is “sufficiently imbued with elements of communi-
cation,”138 but courts and legal scholars struggle to define when
conduct should be considered sufficiently expressive to meet this
threshold.139 Courts do not even agree on how to describe the cate-
gory of conduct that should be protected140: “expressive conduct,”141
“symbolic expression,”142 “symbolic conduct,”143 “combined” speech and
conduct,144 or conduct that “convey[s] an unmistakable message.”145
In defining expressive conduct, courts struggle between recognizing
symbols as a “short cut from mind to mind”146 and the idea that con-
duct cannot “be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”147
137. See infra Part I.B.1.
138. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974).
139. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 577 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (“[W]here suppression of communicative use of the conduct was merely the inci-
dental effect of forbidding the conduct for other reasons [ ] we have allowed the regulation
to stand”); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (protecting sym-
bols as “a short cut from mind to mind”); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990–91 (1978) (defining communicative acts
as those that further First Amendment values); John Greenman, On Communication,
106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1356–57 (2008) (arguing that conduct should be protected when
it is communicative); David McGowan, From Social Friction to Social Meaning: What
Expressive Uses of Code Tell Us About Free Speech, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1515, 1524–26
(2003) (defining expressive conduct as conduct that conveys a mental state); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Discrimination, Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 442
(1995) (“The distinction between mind and body, speech and conduct, expression and
action, holds that speech is privileged above conduct; government may regulate the clash
of bodies but not the stirring of hearts and minds.”). Recognizing the difficulty in defin-
ing expressive conduct, some scholars reject the test entirely and instead suggest alter-
nate approaches to determining what conduct should be subject to the First Amendment.
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1986) (presenting an economic model); Daniel F. Wachtell, Note, No Harm, No
Foul: Reconceptualizing Free Speech Via Tort Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 949, 971–72 (2008)
(presenting a harm principle).
140. See Greenman, supra note 139, at 1339–40 (emphasizing that “[t]he law nomi-
nally protects acts that are ‘expressive,’ but rarely defines that word”).
141. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000).
142. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003).
143. Id. at 361.
144. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
145. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974).
146. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
147. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
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I follow free speech scholars who argue that the central concern
of speech-conduct tests is protecting conduct when it is communi-
cative.148 Rather than focusing on the individual speaker’s intent to
express a message,149 these scholars emphasize the role of social con-
text in communication.150 Conduct communicates a message when
“speakers and listeners . . . understand the practices and conventions
they employ as expressive.”151 In the case of gender, social norms
provide the context that individuals use in performing gender.152
Gender nonconformity should be protected as speech because speak-
ers and listeners understand the conduct as communicative.
Linguistic theorists first explored the role of context in communi-
cation, arguing that language itself can only communicate a message
when it is situated in an appropriate social context.153 For example,
saying “I do” in a wedding ceremony has a very different meaning
from saying “I do” during a theatrical performance.154 Drawing on
this insight, free speech theorists have argued that we cannot eval-
uate conduct in a vacuum.155 Instead, conduct functions as a speech
act when it communicates meaning through the social conventions
of a community or subcommunity.156 First Amendment doctrine men-
tions social context,157 but free speech scholars argue that the Court
relies on social context more than the doctrine explicitly recognizes.158
148. See Greenman, supra note 139, at 1340; McGowan, supra note 139, at 1524–25.
149. See Greenman, supra note 139, at 1343.
150. See McGowan, supra note 139, at 1525–26 (discussing role of social context in
establishing communication).
151. Id. at 1524–25.
152. See West & Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 126–27.
153. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 15–16, 22 (1962) (developing
concept of the speech act). Legal scholars often engage with linguistic theory to develop
the relevance of context to understanding the relationship between conduct and speech.
See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 339–40 (1989);
Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of Conduct,
“Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1326–27 (2005).
154. See AUSTIN, supra note 153, at 15–16, 22.
155. See Lee Tien, Publishing Software as a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 629,
634 (2000).
156. See id. at 635.
157. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974) (“[T]he context in which
a symbol is used for purposes of expression is important, for the context may give meaning
to the symbol.”).
158. See Robert Post, Essay, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1249, 1252 (1995). Post notes that:
[T]he fundamental difficulty with the Spence test is that it locates the es-
sence of constitutionally protected speech exclusively in an abstract triadic
relationship among a speaker’s intent, a specific message, and an audience’s
potential reception of that message . . . [But] the constitutional recognition
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When the Court evaluates whether particular conduct is sufficiently
expressive to merit protection under freedom of speech, it is implic-
itly asking whether the conduct occurs in a social context where it
is understood as communicative.
What does it mean to consider the social context of gender non-
conformity? I argue that social context renders gender nonconfor-
mity legible as speech.159 To explore this, I first imagine how social
context might make dress and appearance inexpressive. We might
imagine a world where gender identity expression communicates no
message at all. In this world, there would be no distinction between
clothes, makeup, hairstyles, or appearance of men and women. Choos-
ing between wearing a dress or tuxedo to a formal event would be as
inconsequential as one’s eye color. Choosing jeans or a skirt would
be as inconsequential as one’s height. Even if I wanted to communi-
cate a female gender identity by wearing a blouse and skirt, no one
would understand the message. Beauty and appearance bias might
still be possible, but they would take on different forms.160 How we
think about beauty is wrapped up in gender: we describe men as hand-
some and women as pretty.161 Some of our standards of beauty, how-
ever, are not dependent on gender.162 We describe symmetrical faces
and well-proportioned bodies as attractive.163 In this hypothetical
world, some beauty standards might survive, but a man could be
handsome in a dress and a woman could be pretty in a tuxedo.
This world is only theoretical. We are not likely to see a world
where appearance does not matter. Most of us would not want to
live in such a world. I do not argue that this world is normatively
desirable. It does, however, help illustrate how social context makes
conduct into expression. More specifically, it illustrates how the lack
of communication as possibly protected speech also depends heavily on the
social context within which this triadic relationship is situated.
Id.
159. Cf. Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and
the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 969–79 (1993).
Barbara Flagg discusses the transparency phenomenon, arguing that whites do not see
whiteness. Id. This results in also failing to appreciate how blacks express racial mes-
sages through their conduct or appearance. Id. Flagg argues for developing conscious-
ness of whiteness to help illuminate what it means to be black. Id. Similarly, I argue that
cisgender blindness to gender results in failing to see how gender nonconformity ex-
presses messages about gender. Taylor Flynn similarly makes this point about cisgender
blindness to gender, labeling it “pink on pink.” See Flynn, supra note 33, at 500–02.
160. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1034–35
(2009) (discussing appearance bias).
161. PENELOPE ECKERT & SUSAN MCCONNELL-GINET, LANGUAGE AND GENDER 60 (2003).
162. See Rhode, supra note 160, at 1035–36 (describing gender-neutral characteristics
that people perceive as attractive).
163. Id.
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of present social context would reduce the communicative quality of
dress and appearance. Gender nonconformity expresses a message
because it noticeably violates a set of gender expectations.
I use restroom choice as a helpful example to illustrate how gen-
der nonconformity communicates a message.164 Everyone communi-
cates a message of gender identity by using a single-sex restroom.165
To use the terms of social construction theories, we have learned that
men use one set of restrooms and women use another set of rest-
rooms.166 Social norms ascribe gender meaning to restroom choice.167
Even if a cisgender woman used the men’s restroom because the line
was shorter, others might think she was a man or be confused by her
restroom choice. Similarly, if a transgender woman uses the women’s
restroom, others will likely either think she is a woman, or challenge
her restroom choice because they think she appears too masculine.
When a trans woman uses the women’s restroom, she communicates
her femininity even if she passes, and especially if she does168: if
no one questions her, then she has successfully communicated that
she is a woman. But even if she is challenged, her restroom choice
communicates a message of gender identity.169 As the Yunits court
explained, “[t]he school’s vehement response and some students’
hostile reactions are proof of the fact that [Doe’s] message clearly
has been received.”170
Gender nonconformity also communicates opposition to the gen-
der binary.171 When a trans woman uses the women’s restroom, she
challenges the assumption that femininity only belongs to cisgender
women. The often visceral reaction to trans restroom use under-
scores how readily audiences understand the conduct to communi-
cate a message of gender nonconformity.172 Sex-segregated restrooms
are so strongly ingrained in the ideology of the gender binary that
164. See infra Part II.C (providing a complete discussion of sex segregated restrooms).
165. See Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 135–36.
166. See id. at 164–65.
167. See id.
168. See YOSHINO, supra note 29 (presenting a detailed examination of the role of
passing in relation to the law).
169. Cf. Greenman, supra note 139, at 1345–46. Greenman compares communicative
conduct to speech in an argument: the conduct seeks to convince others to accept an idea.
Id. While the transgender woman’s gender identity message may be rejected, the conduct
is communicative because others understand and reject the message that she expresses
through her restroom choice.
170. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton School
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
171. See supra notes 99–103 and accompanying text (defining gender binary).
172. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., #1, 294 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2002) (chal-
lenging trans restroom access based on this type of reaction).
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opponents to state equal rights amendments did not have to explain
why unisex restrooms were dangerous.173 We simply assume that
restrooms should be sex-segregated. By choosing the restroom ass-
ociated with their gender identity, trans people communicate oppo-
sition to the gender binary.174
A counterexample emphasizes how social context makes rest-
room choice legible as a gender message. Many colleges now have
some unisex multi-stall public restrooms.175 If restrooms are unisex,
then restroom choice cannot communicate a gender message. Choos-
ing between two different unisex restrooms does not communicate
a message. Restroom choice typically communicates a message of
gender identity because of the underlying assumption that restrooms
should always be sex-segregated.176
One objection to my argument so far is that gender nonconfor-
mity should only be protected as speech when the speaker intends
to communicate a specific message.177 According to this objection,
any message communicated by restroom choice is too vague to be
understood as speech.178 This breaks down into challenges about the
necessary intent of the speaker and the specificity of the message.179
I argue that both of these challenges misunderstand what it means
to protect conduct as communication, and that present free speech
doctrine does not require intent or a specific message. Because gen-
der nonconformity is always situated against social norms,180 it is
difficult to conceive of cases where people do not intend gender non-
conformity to be communicative.181 Gender nonconformity, however,
173. See Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 148–49.
174. Even though challenging a policy is not per se communicative, courts have recog-
nized that conduct used to challenge social policies may be communicative in the proper
social context. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 304–06
(1984) (assuming that sleeping in public parks to challenge policies about homelessness
might be considered expressive conduct under the First Amendment).
175. See Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 139 n.26.
176. See id. at 166.
177. See, e.g., Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (explaining
that a conduct that attempts to communicate a “vague and unfocused” message is pro-
tected minimally under the First Amendment) (citing E. Hartford Educ. Ass’n v. Bd. of
Educ. of E. Hartford, 562 F.2d 828, 858 (2d Cir. 1977)).
178. Cf. id. at 320 (explaining that a school teacher’s refusal to wear a tie in order to
convey “a message of non-conformity and a rejection of older traditions” was not afforded
any First Amendment protection because the message was not sufficiently focused to
trigger protection).
179. See id. at 319.
180. See West & Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 132.
181. Even if courts required specific intent, they might presume this intent in most
cases of gender nonconformity to avoid near impossible inquiries into subjective intent.
See infra note 188 and accompanying text (arguing for imputed intent).
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should be protected because it is communicative, even if someone
does not have this specific intent.
Spence is often described as requiring (1) intent to communi-
cate a specific message, and (2) likelihood that the message would
be understood by the audience.182 In Troster v. Pennsylvania State
Department of Corrections, however, the court explained that if in-
tent were required, “the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schonberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis
Carroll” would not be protected.183 The Troster court notes that the ex-
plicit test from Spence only required “activity [that] was sufficiently
imbued with elements of communication,” while the two prongs of
intent and likelihood of being understood were used to describe the
particular case.184 Moreover, later Supreme Court cases do not all
cite Spence to determine when conduct should be treated as speech.185
Free speech scholars similarly argue that individual intent should
not be a part of the test for when conduct is communicative. For ex-
ample, Professor Greenman argues that the mental state of a nude
dancer does not make the dancing more or less communicative.186
Greenman explains that people communicate ideas that they do not
think or feel.187 The government should not have a greater ability to
regulate communication based on the intent of the speaker. Joshua
Waldman argues that, in practice, courts have collapsed the two
prongs of Spence into one, imputing intent to the speaker based on
whether conduct is understood as communicative.188
A hypothetical illustrates how gender nonconformity is commu-
nicative even if the speaker does not subjectively intend to express
anything. Imagine a transgender man stranded on an island. He
might consider his gender expression crucial to his sense of self, re-
gardless of whether anyone else would ever see him. He might feel
better about himself when he wears men’s clothes. A passenger on
a passing cruise ship who happened to see the trans man on shore
182. See Troster v. Pa. State Dept. of Corr., 65 F.3d 1086, 1090 (1995) (citing Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (describing how other courts have inter-
preted Spence)).
183. Id. (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 569 (1995)).
184. Id. (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 409–10).
185. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, 547 U.S. 47, 49 (2006)
(deciding conduct is not “inherently expressive” but never citing Spence).
186. See Greenman, supra note 139, at 1343 (suggesting nude dancing is communi-
cative even if the dancer is thinking about her trip home).
187. Id.
188. See Joshua Waldman, Note, Symbolic Speech and Social Meaning, 97 COLUM. L.
REV. 1844, 1851–58 (1997).
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might take him to be a man but not realize he is expressing a mes-
sage of gender nonconformity. In that case, the trans man’s appear-
ance communicated his gender identity: “I am a man.” On the other
hand, the passenger might understand the trans man to be trans-
gender and communicating a message of gender nonconformity. In
either case, gender nonconformity is communicative, even if the trans
man was not aware of the ship. Whether or not individual transgen-
der people subjectively intend to express a message, the audience
easily understands the message.189 Gender itself is a message. Even
if a trans woman or man understands their gender entirely in non-
expressive terms, their gender nonconformity is still communicative.
In some cases, the government has argued that gendered dress
and appearance only communicate a diffuse message and should fail
the second prong of Spence.190 For example, in Doe v. Yunits, the
school district argued that young school children could not under-
stand the complex message of transgender identity potentially com-
municated by Pat Doe’s conduct.191 According to the school, Doe’s dress
was like other defiant behavior that did not express any particular
message.192 As the Yunits court recognized, however, Doe’s conduct
was easily understood as expressing gender nonconformity.193 Other
students did not need to understand what it meant to be transgen-
der in order to understand the overall message.194
Professor Dean Spade explained similar challenges he faced
because his behavior did not fit the expected model of transgender
identity:
The fact that I don’t want to change my first name, that I haven’t
sought out the use of the pronoun “he,” that I don’t think that
“lesbian” is the wrong word for me, or, worse yet, that I recog-
nize that the use of any word for myself—lesbian, transperson,
transgender butch, boy, mister, FTM fag, butch—has always
been/will always be strategic, is my undoing in their eyes.195
189. See, e.g., Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Oct, 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton
School Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000) (ex-
plaining that faculty and students understood Doe’s female gender identity).
190. See, e.g., Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319–20 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding
that plaintiff’s desire to wear a skirt only presented a diffuse message).
191. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199 at *4.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Dean Spade, Resisting Medicine, Re/modeling Gender, 18 BERKELEY WOMEN’S
L.J. 15, 21 (2003). Spade’s thinking on this issue has shifted, and he now uses male pro-
nouns. See id. at 19 n.14.
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Spade could be seen as only expressing a diffuse gender message.
Because of the social construction of the gender binary, however, we
always seek to understand behavior as communicating a male or
female identity.196 By consciously refusing to conform to norms of
masculinity or femininity, Pat Doe and Dean Spade are both easily
understood as communicating messages of gender nonconformity.197
In Hurley, the Supreme Court explained that the overall theme of a
parade can be clear, even if the precise meaning of different parts of
the parade is not clear.198 Spade’s overall rejection of gender norms is
clear, whether or not the exact meaning of particular conduct is clear.
I have intentionally argued for a broad range of gender noncon-
formity as communicative. Our present failure to understand gen-
der nonconformity as speech is based on our failure to see “pink on
pink.”199 I recognize the potentially radical breadth of this theory.
However, this theory would not subject all regulation of dress and
appearance choices to First Amendment scrutiny. The crucial test
is whether state regulations target conduct based on nonconformity
with norms of masculinity or femininity.200 Preventing men from
wearing dresses suppresses gender nonconformity, but regulating
saggy pants does not similarly suppress gender nonconformity.201
More importantly, the government may have legitimate reasons like
safety and privacy to regulate dress and appearance. When govern-
ment regulations of gender are not intended to suppress a message,
the regulations do not implicate freedom of speech. My argument is
similar to others who have argued that the test for expressive con-
duct is a low threshold.202 A wide range of conduct may communicate
gender nonconformity, but freedom of speech should only prevent
the government from regulating this conduct specifically in order to
suppress this message of gender nonconformity.
196. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 77, at 205–08.
197. Yunits, 2000 WL 33162199 at *4; Spade, supra note 195, at 21–22.
198. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557,
569–70 (1995).
199. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 500–02.
200. See Ramachandran, supra note 37, at 22–23 (discussing example of lesbian law-
yer wearing high heels and makeup to make point about contextual specificity of com-
municating identity).
201. See Angelica M. Sinopole, Comment, “No Saggy Pants”: A Review of the First
Amendment Issues Presented by the State’s Regulation of Fashion in Public Streets, 113
PENN. ST. L. REV. 329, 354–57 (2008) (suggesting that the audience is not likely to under-
stand message expressed by saggy pants).
202. Cf. Cole & Eskridge, supra note 114, at 323–24 (arguing that same-sex intimacy
should be expressive based on low threshold test); Ramachandran, supra note 37, at 21–24
(arguing that focus on whether conduct is sufficiently expressive ignores how communi-
cation is highly contextual).
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2. Government Regulations of Gender Nonconformity
Violate O’Brien
My central contention in this paper is that when the government
singles out gender nonconformity from other conduct, it suppresses
expression. Under O’Brien, government regulations of conduct are
subject to the First Amendment when the government’s interest is
related to expression.203 The “bedrock principle” is that “the govern-
ment may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because so-
ciety finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.” 204 As the Court
explained in Texas v. Johnson, the state’s concerns with flag burning
“blossom only when a person’s treatment of the flag communicates
some message . . . .” 205
Similarly, the government’s concerns with dress and appearance
only arise when they communicate a message of gender nonconfor-
mity. In Adams, the state was not concerned with women wearing
dresses.206 The state’s concerns arose only because Adams’s dress
communicated a message.207 In contrast to Adams, laws based on gov-
ernment interests in workplace efficiency and professional appear-
ance, education, privacy, and safety may not raise First Amendment
concerns.208 Whenever the state seeks to enforce gender norms by
penalizing gender nonconformity, as in Adams, state action is re-
lated “to the suppression of free expression . . . .” 209
I interpret O’Brien to prohibit singling out certain expressive
conduct as a means of achieving an otherwise valid government
interest.210 This interpretation follows from the purpose of O’Brien:
203. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that government
interest in efficient draft is unrelated to expressive use of burning draft card); see also
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
204. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); see also Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535
U.S. 564, 573 (2002) (“[A]s a general matter, the First Amendment means that govern-
ment has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
205. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410 (referencing the governing test announced in O’Brien).
206. See City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
207. Id.
208. I do not think these ends are always independent of the communicative nature
of gender nonconformity, but I think they may be in at least some cases. I discuss these
further in relation to specific examples in Part II.
209. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
210. Other scholars similarly interpret Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432–33 (1984),
as restricting the means of determining best interests of the child. According to these
scholars, racial factors may sometimes be legitimate to the best interests of the child, but
consideration of societal prejudice is an illegitimate means. Cf. Elizabeth Erin Bosquet,
Commentary, Contextualizing and Analyzing Alabama’s Approach to Gay and Lesbian
Custody Rights, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1625, 1629, 1643 (2000) (applying Palmore to gay and
lesbian adoption to argue that courts should only consider sexual orientation when there
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government regulations of conduct should be subject to strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment when they regulate conduct in order to
suppress communication of a message. Moreover, this interpretation
is consistent with how courts apply O’Brien in practice.211 For example,
in Tinker, the school may have had a valid interest in minimizing
disruptions.212 When the school singled out students wearing black
armbands because those armbands expressed a message, however,
the means were related to a state interest in the message expressed.213
When state action singles out conduct because it expresses gen-
der nonconformity, the state action is related to expression. As in
Tinker, Pat Doe’s school had a valid interest in a proper school en-
vironment.214 But when the school chose to penalize Doe’s choice to
wear the same clothes that other girls could wear, the school singled
out Doe’s gender nonconformity. Doe’s conduct was singled out be-
cause it expressed a message of nonconformity. Whenever the state
penalizes gender nonconformity but not other conduct, it necessarily
acts to suppress communication.215
In some cases, courts suggest that the state may have an inter-
est in the “status” of being transgender that is independent of the
expression of gender nonconformity.216 This alleged interest in the
status of being transgender, however, cannot be separated from ex-
pression of gender nonconformity. The state is interested in status
because it is constituted through conduct that expresses nonconfor-
mity with the gender binary. As others have argued in the context of
sexuality, the First Amendment should protect conduct that expresses
a status-based identity.217 It is instructive to compare the government
is a nexus between parental sexual orientation and child welfare); James S. Bowen,
Cultural Convergences and Divergences: The Nexus Between Putative Afro-American
Family Values and the Best Interests of the Child, 26 J. FAM. L. 487, 521–22 (1987–1988)
(arguing that Palmore allows race to remain part of custody decisions but not as a decisive
factor); Eileen M. Blackwood, Note, Race as a Factor in Custody and Adoption Disputes:
Palmore v. Sidoti, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 209, 222–24 (1985) (discussing the relationship
between racial considerations as means and ends of best interest of the child); Robert B.
Weinstock, Note, Palmore v. Sidoti: Color-Blind Custody, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 245, 268–69
(1984) (concluding that Palmore does not prohibit consideration of legitimate racial factors).
211. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969)
(holding that school could not prevent students from wearing black armbands).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 510.
214. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *3 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton Sch.
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
215. See id. at *4.
216. See, e.g., Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1084 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
that Title VII does not apply to status of being transsexual).
217. David Cole and William Eskridge appear to have first proposed this idea, arguing
that sex expresses intimacy. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 114, at 328–29. Their
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interests in gender nonconformity to the nude dancing cases and eth-
nic clothing cases. The Court’s decisions upholding these regulations
are distinguishable from cases involving gender nonconformity.218
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., the Court upheld the Indiana pub-
lic indecency statute because it was based on order and morality.219
The statute required female dancers to wear at least pasties and a
G-string.220 The plurality explained that “[t]he perceived evil that
Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity.” 221
Justice Souter concurred because the state’s interest was the sec-
ondary effects of nude dancing establishments, and not the danc-
ing itself.222 Justice Scalia also concurred, describing the law as “a
general law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at ex-
pression . . . .” 223 For different reasons, the Justices agreed that the
Indiana law was not related to the expressive component of nude
dancing.224 Public nudity is understood as being immoral.225 By find-
ing reasons to regulate nude dancing that were supposedly not re-
lated to the message expressed, the Justices all implicitly agreed
that if the public indecency statute only targeted the message of
eroticism, the statute would be unconstitutional.226
In Zalewska v. County of Sullivan,227 the state’s interests are
more plausibly unrelated to the message expressed by Zalewska’s
dress. In Zalewska, the Second Circuit held that an employee’s wish
to wear a skirt was not sufficiently expressive because the broad
statement of cultural values was “vague and unfocused,” and viewers
may not understand any message.228 In this case, the government
argument has been expanded by other scholars. See Megan Stuart, Saying, Wearing,
Watching, and Doing: Equal First Amendment Protection for Coming Out, Having Sex,
and Possessing Child Pornography, 11 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 341, 346–49 (2010); Shannon
Gilreath, Sexually Speaking: “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the First Amendment After
Lawrence v. Texas, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 953, 958–60 (2007); James Allon
Garland, Breaking the Enigma Code: Why the Law Has Failed to Recognize Sex as
Expressive Conduct Under the First Amendment, and Why Sex Between Men Proves That
It Should, 12 L. & SEXUALITY: A REV. OF LESBIAN, GAY , BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER LEGAL
ISSUES 159, 164–66 (2003); Dale Carpenter, Review Essay, The Limits of Gaylaw, 17
CONST. COMMENT. 603, 633–41 (2000).
218. I would also argue that the nude dancing and ethnic clothing cases are wrongly
decided, but my argument about gender nonconformity does not depend on this.
219. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568–72 (1991).
220. Id. at 563.
221. Id. at 571.
222. Id. at 582 (Souter, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 586.
225. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991).
226. See id. at 565.
227. Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314 (2d Cir. 2003).
228. Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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asserted that pants were safer for van drivers because skirts might
get caught in the van’s moving parts.229 It is suspicious that the
government never previously complained about Zalewska wearing
a skirt.230 An employer, however, could have legitimate reasons to
impose new safety requirements.231 To the extent that the state’s
interest was based on safety, it meets O’Brien’s requirement that a
regulation not be based on the message expressed.
Regulations of gender nonconformity are distinct from both
Zalewska and Barnes. Unlike Zalewska, the government’s interests
in regulating gender nonconformity focus directly on the social
meaning of dress and appearance. In Zalewska, the government re-
quired all van drivers to wear the same uniform for safety reasons.232
In Barnes, the Court agreed that the government could not regulate
nude dancing if it did so to target eroticism.233 In Yunits, the school
district admitted that other girls could wear the same clothes pro-
hibited for Pat Doe.234 The school’s concerns only arose because when
Pat Doe wore the same clothes as other girls, her conduct commu-
nicated gender nonconformity. The court made this point when it
chastised the school for “appear[ing] unable to distinguish between
instances of conduct connected to plaintiff’s expression of her female
gender identity, such as the wearing of a wig or padded bra, and sep-
arate from it, such as grabbing a male student’s buttocks or blowing
kisses to a male student.” 235 When the government singles out gen-
der nonconformity, it does so because of the social meaning of dress
and appearance.
C. Other First Amendment Concerns
Now I want to return to City of Cincinnati v. Adams.236 When
I first discussed this case, I argued that by arresting Adams, the
Cincinnati police suppressed communication of gender nonconfor-
mity.237 But the regulation in Adams also raises concerns of view-
point discrimination, vagueness, overbreadth, and compelled speech.
229. Id. at 317.
230. See id. (noting that Zalewska “[had] never worn pants in her entire life”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).
234. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction), aff’d sub nom. Doe v. Brockton School
Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App. Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
235. Id. at *5.
236. 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
237. See supra Introduction.
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These additional concerns similarly arise in contemporary regulations
of gender nonconformity.
A prohibition on government viewpoint discrimination is central
to all free speech values.238 Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the
state “regulate[s] speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas
at the expense of others.” 239 For example, the Supreme Court held
that if a school district would allow use of school facilities by most
social organizations to show films about family values, then the dis-
trict has engaged in viewpoint discrimination by denying a church’s
request to use school facilities to show films about family values from
a religious perspective.240 Viewpoint discrimination violates theories
of democracy because it allows the government to undermine self-
government by the people.241 Speech should be protected to provide
all information relevant to decision-making.
In Adams, someone could only be arrested under the cross-
dressing ordinance if the police specifically found that they wore
dress or a costume associated with the other gender.242 The law did
not regulate costumes generally.243 Instead, it prohibited wearing
costumes that expressed a message of gender nonconformity.244 This
viewpoint discrimination is offensive to free speech values.
Even when the government has a valid interest in restricting
speech, any laws must specifically describe what speech is restricted.245
The ordinance in Adams also fails this test, raising the related First
Amendment concerns of vagueness and overbreadth. Vague laws do
not sufficiently define what speech or conduct is prohibited, and over-
broad laws regulate both protected and unprotected speech. Both
raise a concern with excessive chilling of speech.246 In Board of Airport
Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., the Supreme Court struck down
a Los Angeles Airport regulation for overbreadth.247 An airport might
legitimately regulate solicitation that interfered with airport safety,248
238. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984).
239. Id.
240. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 393–94 (1993).
241. See SCHAUER, supra note 62, at 39 (“[I]f the government is the servant, censorship
by government is anomalous. It results in the servants pre-selecting the information
available to the sovereign . . . .”).
242. City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 464 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974).
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id. at 465.
246. See id. at 465–66 (holding that an ordinance that fails to give ascertainable stan-
dards of conduct is unconstitutionally vague); see also Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1987) (holding that an airport regulation that reaches
protected speech in a nonpublic forum is unconstitutionally overbroad).
247. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 577 (1987).
248. Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 685 (1992).
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but Los Angeles’s prohibition on all “First Amendment activit[ies]”
potentially extended to “talking and reading, or the wearing of cam-
paign buttons or symbolic clothing.” 249 Even if the airport only in-
tended to enforce the regulation narrowly, the Court explained that
the overbreadth could have a chilling effect on protected speech.250
In City of Chicago v. Morales, the Court held that Chicago’s Gang
Congregation Ordinance was vague but not overbroad.251 The ordi-
nance prohibited “criminal street gang members” from “loitering”
with one another in public.252 The Court held that the ordinance did
not violate overbreadth doctrine because “it [did] not prohibit any
form of conduct that is apparently intended to convey a message.” 253
The ordinance, however, violated vagueness doctrine for two reasons.
The ordinance failed to give sufficient notice of what conduct was
prohibited and gave arbitrary enforcement power to police.254
The ordinance in Adams suffers from both vagueness and
overbreadth.255 The ordinance was vague because it was not clear
what might constitute a “costume not customarily worn by his or
her sex . . . .” 256 A man wearing a dress seems to fall clearly inside
the ordinance, but the boundaries are unclear. The ordinance does
not specify, for example, whether a man could wear a wig or a woman
could wear jeans. The ordinance was also overbroad. It may have
been constitutional to prohibit wearing costumes for criminal pur-
poses, but the ordinance covered a much broader range of conduct,
including Adams’s own conduct.257 It may have even covered wear-
ing a costume at Halloween or for a theatrical performance.
Finally, cases like Adams raise compelled speech concerns. Just
as the state cannot prevent someone from speaking, “[it] may [not]
constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemi-
nation of an ideological message.” 258 In Wooley v. Maynard, the Court
overturned a law requiring the display of the slogan “Live Free or
Die” on license plates.259 The Court explained that “New Hampshire’s
249. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. at 571, 575.
250. Id. at 576.
251. City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 51–52 (1999).
252. Id. at 45–46.
253. Id. at 53.
254. Id. at 56.
255. City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463, 466 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1974). In con-
temporary cases, this vagueness concern might arise when there is a lack of consensus
on what is considered “provocative” dressing in employment cases with trans persons.
See Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee Appearance, 26 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 1395, 1399–1400 (1992).
256. Adams, 330 N.E.2d at 464.
257. Id. at 466.
258. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977).
259. Id.
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statute in effect requires that appellees use their private property
as a ‘mobile billboard’ for the State’s ideological message . . . .” 260
The Court contrasted the compelled expression in the slogan with
the required use of the state seal on official documents.261 Because
a state seal is intended to verify authenticity, it does not compel
expression of an ideological message.262
State regulations of conduct do not compel speech simply because
someone finds the conduct distasteful.263 As Professor Koppelman
explains:
If . . . one is excused from obeying any law if obedience would
send a message, and the objector gets to decide whether obedi-
ence sends a message, then all laws are invalid in all their appli-
cations because this defense will be available in a prosecution for
any violation of the law, from double parking to homicide.264
In order for regulation of conduct to be compelled speech, the state
must intend the regulation to compel expression of a message.265
Child custody orders raise clear issues of compelled speech.
Courts have required parents to say or do certain things in order to
maintain custody of their children.266 In the gender nonconformity
context, this could mean courts requiring parents to perform a
“normal” gender identity.267 In this case, the court compels conduct
based on the message that the conduct will express.268 Similarly,
restroom restrictions also raise concerns of compelled speech. In
Etsitty v. Utah Transit Authority, the government required a trans-
gender female employee to use the men’s restrooms while at work.269
To many transgender activists and advocates, this kind of enforced
restroom segregation is a violent suppression of their identity.270
260. Id. at 715.
261. Id. at 715 n.11.
262. Id.
263. ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?:
HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE
ASSOCIATION 32 (2009).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 39.
266. See, e.g., In re Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D., 862 P.2d 368, 371–77 (Mont. 1993)
(reversing trial court decision awarding only supervised visitation to father with require-
ment that he not cross-dress or present himself as a woman in front of the child).
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007).
270. See, e.g., LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANS LIBERATION: BEYOND PINK OR BLUE 68 (1998);
PEEING IN PEACE, supra note 59, at 3; Pooja Gehi, Struggles from the Margins: Anti-
Immigrant Legislation and the Impact on Low-Income Transgender People of Color, 30
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 315, 326 (2009).
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Enforced restroom segregation, nevertheless, is not compelled speech
because the individual using the restroom subjectively claims that
they are being forced to express a message.271 Instead, the state com-
pelled Krystal Etsitty to use the men’s restroom specifically in order
to communicate a message of gender conformity.272
D. Why Not Antidiscrimination Law?
Some activists may argue that I mischaracterize the core wrong
inflicted by transgender discrimination.273 According to this argu-
ment, by focusing on free speech, I might be seen to suggest that
transgender discrimination primarily harms people by restricting
their ability to express thoughts and ideas.274 To many transgender
people, the core wrong of trans discrimination is much deeper and
more personal than an abstract free speech restriction. Not being
able to use a restroom of their choice is experienced as a devaluation
of their personal worth and integrity, not as an abstract restriction
on their ability to express a gender message.275
This criticism misunderstands the goal of my argument. I do
not attempt to replace status-based protection with free speech.276
I do not argue that transgender discrimination primarily injures in-
dividuals by restricting their ability to freely express ideas. Instead,
I argue that anti-trans laws harm individuals and violate free speech
values on the limits of government action. Moreover, I suggest that
arguments from freedom of speech illustrate how present antidis-
crimination law reinforces the cultural gender binary.277 Preventing
a transgender girl from expressing her femininity at school may cause
271. Cf. KOPPELMAN, supra note 263, at 32 (explaining why compelled speech requires
more than subjective opposition to the meaning of the law).
272. I discuss potential state interests in restroom segregation below. See infra Part II.C.
273. Cf. Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian
and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 UCLA L. REV. 519, 532–34 (2001) (defending
against a similar argument that using sex discrimination mischaracterizes the core wrong
of anti-lesbian and gay discrimination).
274. Cf. Edward Stein, Evaluating the Sex Discrimination Argument for Lesbian and
Gay Rights, 49 UCLA L. REV. 471, 498–505 (2001) (presenting a similar argument that
a sex discrimination defense of lesbian and gay rights improperly characterizes lesbian
and gay discrimination based on sexism instead of heterosexism).
275. See PEEING IN PEACE, supra note 59, at 3.
276. Cf. JACOB HALE, SUGGESTED RULES FOR NON-TRANSSEXUALS WRITING ABOUT
TRANSSEXUALS, TRANSSEXUALITY, TRANSSEXUALISM, OR TRANS ____ (2009), available at
http://sandystone.com/hale.rules.html (admonishing non-trans writers dealing with trans
topics not to position their personal political commitments above those of trans people).
277. Cf. Flagg, supra note 159, at 958 (arguing that present law “blinds” us to cultural
racial stereotypes).
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direct psychological harm far graver than any abstract speech re-
striction, but the restriction on speech rights is also a real harm.278
I recognize the critical expansion of legal protection for trans peo-
ple via antidiscrimination and equality legislation and case law.279 An
increasing number of states and cities include gender identity in their
antidiscrimination laws.280 Federal courts seem to be moving towards
protecting trans people against discrimination in employment,281 pub-
lic accommodations,282 and prisons283 based on Title VII and similar
laws.284 Other federal agencies are also specifically adopting rules to
protect trans people.285 As these protections are increasingly avail-
able, many scholars and activists argue for the practical utility of
these antidiscrimination laws.286 These status-based protections of
278. Cf. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Yunits, No. 001060A, 2000 WL 33162199, at *4 (Mass. Super.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2000) (order for preliminary injunction) (using free speech theory), aff’d sub
nom. Doe v. Brockton School Comm., No. 2000-J-638, 2000 WL 33342399 (Mass. App.
Ct. Nov. 30, 2000).
279. See PAISLEY CURRAH ET AL., THE STATE OF TRANSGENDER RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 6–9, 13 (National Sexuality Resource Center 2008) (defining “trans-
gender rights” and discussing what strategies have worked so far); Flynn, supra note 33,
at 468.
280. See NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE, JURISDICTIONS WITH EXPLICITLY
TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE NONDISCRIMINATION LAWS (2008), available at http://www
.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/all_jurisdictions_w_pop_8_08.pdf (listing
thirteen states, the District of Columbia, and 108 city and county laws).
281. See, e.g., Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (D.D.C. 2008).
282. See, e.g., Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Trust Co., 214 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2000)
(using a sex stereotype theory under Equal Credit Opportunity Act to protect trans-
gender access to bank).
283. See, e.g., Fields v. Smith, 653 F.3d 550, 559 (7th Cir. 2011) (requiring prison to
provide hormones as medical necessity); Battista v. Clarke, 645 F.3d 449, 455 (1st Cir.
2011) (same); Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1204 (9th Cir. 2000) (using Gender
Motivated Violence Act to protect transgender prisoner).
284. See Ilona M. Turner, Comment, Sex Stereotyping Per Se: Transgender Employees
and Title VII, 95 CAL. L. REV. 561, 561–62 (2007) (outlining increasing protections for
trans people against employment discrimination).
285. See, e.g., Macy v. Dep’t of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120120821 (Apr. 20, 2012)
(clarifying that EEOC will treat discrimination against transgender people as based on
sex); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, New Policy on Gender Change in Passports
Announced (June 9, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142922
.htm (announcing new policies to facilitate changing gender marker on passports).
286. See, e.g., Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, Unprincipled Exclusions: The
Struggle to Achieve Judicial and Legislative Equality for Transgender People, 7 WM. &
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 37, 54–55 (2000) (arguing for the use of sex discrimination law on
both conceptual and strategic grounds); see also Anna Kirkland, What’s at Stake in
Transgender Discrimination as Sex Discrimination?, 32 SIGNS 83, 106 (2006) (noting that
the use of sex discrimination law is currently the most viable argument available to
lawyers). Feminist scholars have made similar arguments. See Mary Anne C. Case,
Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate Man in the
Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1995); Katherine M. Franke, The
Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex from Gender, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
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transgender people emphasize how gender identity is a core part of
personal identity.287
Despite growing protections under antidiscrimination laws, schol-
ars also identify many limits to this strategy.288 In particular, dress
and appearance are treated as matters of personal preference, un-
protected by most antidiscrimination law. As Kenji Yoshino argues,
people can be legally required to cover their differences.289 Both
public and private employers can generally enforce dress codes and
appearance standards.290 An extensive legal scholarship criticizes
courts’ willingness to defer to employers’ proffered justifications for
dress codes, illustrating how present antidiscrimination law rein-
forces the gender binary.291 By focusing only on intentional discrimi-
nation, present antidiscrimination doctrine fails to recognize how
regulations of dress and appearance are situated in broader struc-
tural inequalities.292
Because dress, appearance, and other conduct are used to ex-
press identity, expressive identity claims cannot be easily separated
from broader issues of gender equality.293 My argument from freedom
of speech can help expand antidiscrimination doctrine by highlighting
287. See Currah & Minter, supra note 286, at 50.
288. See id. at 48–57 (identifying four key potential limits to antidiscrimination
laws); see also Kirkland, supra note 286, at 92 (arguing that Title VII protections are
narrower than they seem); Vade, supra note 27, at 262 (arguing that antidiscrimination
law treats sex as more real than gender); Franklin H. Romeo, Note, Beyond a Medical
Model: Advocating for a New Conception of Gender Identity in the Law, 36 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 713, 724–30 (2005) (describing limits of medical model in protecting trans-
gender people).
289. See YOSHINO, supra note 29, at 177–78.
290. See Klare, supra note 255, at 1412–30 (discussing constitutional and statutory
limits on employer ability to regulate dress and appearance).
291. See, e.g., Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and
Dress Codes, 41 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 303 (2007) (arguing that cognitive biases influence
judicial decision making on gendered dress codes by obscuring the relationship between
dress codes and gender inequality); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:
Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 2541, 2544–45 (1994) (criticizing overuse of community standards in justifying
dress codes); Klare, supra note 255, at 1398 (arguing that dress codes police gender and
empower employers to “enforce conformity to white, heterosexual, Christian images of
beauty and proper grooming.”); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the
Intersection of Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 383–85 (1991) (discussing social,
political, and cultural meanings of hairstyles).
292. Cf. SPADE, supra note 29, at 84–85 (arguing that the perpetrator-victim dyad
dominant in antidiscrimination law prevents understanding how broader social struc-
tures disadvantage transgender people).
293. Nan Hunter suggests the concept of “expressive identity claim[s]” as “an equality
challenge in which the identity cannot easily be separated from a message.” Nan D.
Hunter, Accommodating the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV.
1591, 1592 (2001); see also Nan D. Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum:
Toward Anti-Orthodoxy and Inclusion, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 1671, 1672 (2000) (arguing equal-
ity and expression cannot be easily separated).
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the cultural gender norms behind dress and appearance discrimina-
tion, linking it with broader concerns about gender equality.294 Even
when they do not create “unequal burdens” under present doctrine,
gendered dress codes create inequalities in people’s abilities to ex-
press their gender identity.295 These inequalities particularly fall on
transgender people, but my analysis is also more broadly applicable
to the treatment of sex discrimination under Title VII.296
II. TESTING THE THEORY WITH ACTUAL CASES
I now turn to apply this theory to actual cases involving govern-
ment employment, child custody, and restroom access. The central
goal of this Part is to demonstrate that my argument is not only theo-
retically sound, but also reflects actual government practices of singling
out conduct in order to suppress messages of gender nonconformity.
I use actual cases to situate my argument in broader issues:
dress codes and government employment, parental speech and child
custody decisions, and sex-segregated restrooms. I examine both the
potential and limits of freedom of speech in addressing these broader
concerns. Finally, I consider arguments against protecting freedom
of speech in each area. I have chosen these case areas both because
they represent common challenges facing transgender people and
because they illustrate the potential and limits of freedom of speech.
Strategic decisions for protecting transgender rights depend on as-
sessing the strength of various legal theories in these areas.
A. Gender Nonconformity in Government Employment
In August 2004, Diane Schroer applied for a position as a special-
ist in terrorism and international crime at the Library of Congress.297
Schroer used her legal name at the time, “David J. Schroer,” on the
application.298 Although Schroer had been diagnosed with gender
294. Cf. Flagg, supra note 159, at 957 (discussing the “transparency phenomenon” in
relation to race). Because my argument does not depend on subjective intent of trans-
gender people to express gender nonconformity, it is also not inconsistent with antidis-
crimination strategies that present transgender identity as non-volitional. See supra
notes 180–99 and accompanying text (arguing subjective intent should not be relevant).
295. See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106, 1108 (9th Cir.
2006) (en banc) (holding dress code does not create “unequal burdens”). Some scholars
also argue that First Amendment protections should directly reach into private work-
places by getting rid of the state action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Ramachandran, supra note 37, at 50 n.177.
296. Taylor Flynn similarly argues that free speech jurisprudence could expand anti-
discrimination law. See Flynn, supra note 33, at 484.
297. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295 (D.D.C. 2008).
298. Id.
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identity disorder, she was still developing a plan for a medically super-
vised transition from male to female.299 During the application pro-
cess, Schroer maintained a traditionally male appearance.300 Schroer
held masters degrees in history and international relations.301 She had
twenty-five years’ experience in the military, where she had reached
the rank of Colonel, leading a military operation to track internation-
al terrorist organizations.302 Schroer was interviewed in October 2004
and received the highest score of the eighteen interviewees.303 The
library offered the job to Schroer in December, because Schroer was
“significantly better than the other candidates.” 304
While the library was completing the final paperwork for the hire,
Schroer went to lunch with Charlotte Preece, the Assistant Director
for Foreign Affairs, who was overseeing the hiring process.305 Dur-
ing lunch, Schroer revealed that she was transsexual and planned
to begin the new position as “Diane.” 306 Preece reacted by asking,
“Why in the world would you want to do that?”307 She continued to
ask Schroer various questions about the transition process, how it
would impact her job performance, and how it would impact her
security clearance.308 During their conversation, Schroer showed
Preece three photos of herself dressed in female attire.309 Preece
later admitted that she thought Schroer looked like “a man dressed
in women’s clothing.” 310
The next day, Preece called Schroer to rescind the job offer.311
While Preece claimed to be concerned with Schroer’s ability to main-
tain her security clearance after transitioning, Preece did not actually
investigate how Schroer’s security clearance would be impacted.312
299. Id.
300. Id. at 295–96.
301. Id. at 295.
302. Id.
303. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 295–96 (D.D.C. 2008).
304. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. Id. at 295–96.
306. Id. at 296.
307. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
308. Id. at 297.
309. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (D.D.C. 2008).
310. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
311. Id. at 299.
312. After lunch, Preece asked Cynthia Wilkins, the personnel security officer of the
library, how transitioning would impact a security clearance. Preece did not provide
Schroer’s full name and social security number, so Wilkins could not have reviewed
Schroer’s history and present clearance status. The next day Wilkins told Preece that
she was not sure how transitioning would impact Schroer’s clearance status. While
Wilkins suggested some concerns with Schroer’s clearance, she never actually reviewed
Schroer’s file and could not actually determine how Schroer’s personal clearance would
or would not be impacted. Id. at 297–98.
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Moreover, Preece admitted that she likely would have rescinded the
offer to Schroer even if Schroer could maintain her security clear-
ance.313 Instead, Preece acted on her discomfort with the idea of
Schroer transitioning from male to female.314 Preece had been puz-
zled as to why a former Special Forces Colonel would decide to tran-
sition.315 In particular, two of Preece’s reasons for rejecting Schroer’s
job offer reveal how Preece’s decision was based on the message ex-
pressed by Schroer’s transition.316 First, Preece was concerned that
Schroer might lose some of her military contacts because her con-
tacts “would no longer want to associate with her because she is
transgender.” 317 Second, Preece was concerned that Schroer would
not seem credible when testifying before Congress because everyone
would know that Schroer had been male.318 Preece failed to follow
up with Schroer’s references to address any legitimate concerns
about Schroer’s future job performance.319 Instead, Preece’s reason-
ing focused on the message of gender nonconformity communicated
by Schroer’s conduct.320
Gender nonconformity is related to the broader issue of dress
and appearance regulation in government employment, particularly
as interpreted under Title VII.321 I begin this section by examining
challenges to government dress codes and appearance standards. I
use these cases to explore the general free speech values implicated
in government employer regulation of dress and appearance. I then
review cases involving transgender employees to argue that when
the government treats gender nonconformity differently from other
gender expression, it suppresses communication of gender noncon-
formity. The government cannot act merely on the basis of trans-
gender status of an employee without penalizing communication.322
313. Id. at 299.
314. See id.
315. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 296 (D.D.C. 2008).
316. In addition to the two reasons listed here, Preece also mentioned three other rea-
sons to rescind the job offer: (1) Schroer seemed less trustworthy because she had not men-
tioned her transition initially; (2) Schroer’s transition might impact her job performance;
and (3) Schroer might not retain her security clearance. Preece did not discuss any of these
concerns with Schroer, did not ask Schroer to speak with Schroer’s friends who had tran-
sitioned and maintained security clearances, and did not speak with any of Schroer’s ref-
erences who were aware of Schroer’s plans to transition. Id. at 297–98.
317. Id. at 297.
318. Id. at 298.
319. Id. at 297.
320. See id. at 305, 308.
321. In Schroer, the court held that the Library of Congress violated Title VII under
two legal theories: discrimination based on sex stereotypes and discrimination because
of sex. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (D.D.C. 2008).
322. See supra note 217 (arguing that regulation of transgender “status” necessarily
suppresses communication).
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Following my interpretation of O’Brien,323 even if workplace efficiency
and professional appearance are legitimate government ends, singling
out gender nonconformity should be an impermissible means because
it penalizes communication.
1. Broader Issue: Dress Codes and Government Employment
When the government acts as employer, courts must balance the
government’s interest as employer against employees’ speech rights
as citizens.324 Thus, some speech that would be protected in other
settings is not protected in a public employment setting. In partic-
ular, courts are hesitant to interfere with dress codes because “[i]n
employee-employer relationships the constitutional area is, and
should be, small. . . . The federal courts are not in the business of
reviewing day-to-day administrative judgments.” 325
Under the governing balancing test announced in Pickering v.
Board of Education, the Court protects free speech by balancing “the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon mat-
ters of public concern and the interest of the State as an employer
in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through
its employees.” 326 In particular, the Court stresses “having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance” as “the core
value of the Free Speech Clause.” 327 Connick v. Myers narrowed this
test by protecting employee speech only when it is “as a citizen upon
matters of public concern . . . [not] as an employee upon matters
only of personal interest . . . .” 328 Garcetti v. Ceballos further nar-
rowed the balancing test by denying First Amendment protection to
speech made in the course of an employee’s official duties.329
323. See supra notes 203–16.
324. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Various scholars have
criticized this dominant balancing approach. See infra note 330.
325. Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 763–64 (1st Cir. 1976) (assuming that female
teacher’s skirts were an appropriate length, public school can still dismiss the teacher
based on concerns with school administration).
326. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (protecting right of public school teacher to publish news-
paper editorial criticizing school board). The Court refined this with a burden-shifting
framework in Doyle, allowing the government to show that it would have reached the
same employment decision even in the absence of the protected speech. Bd. of Educ. v.
Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
327. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
328. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 139, 147 (1983) (questionnaire about internal office
policies and morale, circulated to other employees, was not a matter of public concern).
The Court stressed “the common-sense realization that government offices could not
function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Id. at 143.
329. 547 U.S. 410, 410–11 (2006) (district attorney’s memo recommending dismissal
of a case was not protected speech because it was written as part of official duties).
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Various scholars have criticized the balancing approach for exces-
sively limiting employee speech, arguing that it is inconsistent with
the First Amendment to allow courts and government employers to
determine what matters are of concern to the public.330 Reforming
present doctrine based on these criticisms would strengthen my ar-
gument by preventing government employers or courts from deciding
that gender norms are not a matter of public concern. Even under
present doctrine, however, gender norms should be considered a mat-
ter of public concern. The state’s interest in workplace efficiency is
unrelated to employee communication of gender nonconformity.331
Jespersen v. Harrah’s vividly illustrates how courts interpret
Title VII to permit employer dress codes that target gender expres-
sion.332 Darlene Jespersen had been a highly rated bartender at
Harrah’s Casino for nearly twenty years when the casino instituted
a new dress code.333 This new dress code required women to wear
stockings, colored nail polish, and to wear their hair “teased, curled,
or styled.” 334 The dress code was shortly amended to require women
to wear makeup.335 Jespersen was fired after she refused to wear
makeup, explaining that it made her feel “very degraded and very de-
meaned” and harmed her dignity.336 The court found that Jespersen
failed to present evidence that Harrah’s dress code imposed an un-
equal burden on women and thereby violated Title VII.337 Harrah’s
330. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective,
24 J.L. & POL. 129, 129 (2008); Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern:
Toward a Better Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV.
993, 996 (1997); Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A Critique
of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech Cases, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 121, 122 (1996); Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech:
Government’s Control of Its Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J.
1, 2 (2009).
331. Cf. Michèle Alexandre, When Freedom Is Not Free: Investigating the First Amend-
ment’s Potential for Providing Protection Against Sexual Profiling in the Public Workplace,
15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 377, 377–78 (2009) (making a similar argument for pro-
tecting female employees’ dress and appearance under freedom of speech).
332. Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
While Jespersen involved a private employer, it highlights how courts treat dress and ap-
pearance under Title VII. See Symposium, Makeup, Identity Performance & Discrimination,
14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1 (2006) (including discussion and criticism of Jespersen
by several prominent legal scholars). For a case where the government uses a dress code
that feminizes women, see Bethanne Walz McNamara, Comment, All Dressed Up With
No Place to Go: Gender Bias in Oklahoma Federal Court Dress Codes, 30 TULSA L.J. 395,
396–97 (1994) (finding that dress codes in federal district courts of Oklahoma feminized
women by requiring them to wear dresses).
333. Jespersen, 444 F.3d at 1107.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1108.
337. Id. at 1104–05.
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dress code penalized Jespersen for refusing to express a particular,
highly feminized, gender message.
Courts have treated government dress codes largely the same
as private employers, marginalizing free speech concerns.338 They
assume that dress and appearance do not express any core element
of identity.339 Dress and appearance are treated as trivial, personal
matters. Accordingly, my free speech argument is embedded in
broader issues of employee autonomy and dignity as expressed
through dress and appearance.
Zalewska v. County of Sullivan from the Second Circuit is typ-
ical of federal courts’ deferral to the government in matters of em-
ployee dress and appearance.340 Grazyna Zalewska worked as a van
driver for the county.341 After the county imposed a new dress code re-
quiring van drivers to wear a uniform that included pants, Zalewska
requested permission to wear a skirt because she “never wor[e] pants
in her entire life” and “the wearing of a skirt constitutes . . . an
expression of a deeply held cultural value.” 342 The county refused
this request, explaining that “pants are safer than skirts for the
operators of vans.” 343 When Zalewska continued to wear a skirt, she
was suspended from her position as a van driver and eventually trans-
ferred to a different post.344
Zalewska challenged this suspension and transfer on free speech
grounds. The court’s analysis focused on whether Zalewska’s “ac-
tions constitute[d] expressive conduct,” 345 recognizing that “clothing
communicates an array of ideas and information about the wearer.
It can indicate cultural background and values, religious or moral
disposition, creativity or its lack . . . flamboyancy, gender identity,
and social status.” 346 In this case, however, the court held that “the
338. See Mark R. Bandsuch, S.J., Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace
Appearance Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 321–24 (2009) (arguing that in
dress code cases, Title VII protections are treated similar to other constitutional pro-
tections); Jennifer L. Levi, Misapplying Equality Theories: Dress Codes at Work, 19 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 353, 356 (2008) (documenting how courts uphold gender dress codes
under Title VII); Ramachandran, supra note 37, at 16–17 (arguing that Courts do not
adequately protect dress and appearance as a form of expression under freedom of speech
and equal protection).
339. See Fisk, supra note 38, at 1112–13 (arguing that dress and appearance are core
elements of personal autonomy and should be protected against arbitrary employer in-
terference based on concerns with privacy).
340. Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that an em-
ployee’s choice to wear a skirt is not protected speech because the message is too diffuse).
341. Id. at 317.
342. Id. at 317–18 (internal quotation marks omitted).
343. Id. at 317 (internal quotation marks omitted).
344. Id. at 318.
345. Id. at 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
346. Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 319 (2d Cir. 2003).
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message that Zalewska intend[ed] to convey is not a specific, particu-
larized message.” 347 The court’s analysis ignores the social construc-
tion of the gender binary underlying Zalewska’s conduct. Zalewska
sought to reaffirm a traditional gender message rather than express-
ing nonconformity, but her conduct should still be understood as
communicative when her individual behavior is situated against a
structure of social norms defining gender.
Because the court decided that Zalewska’s conduct was not com-
municative, it upheld the dress code under rational basis review
based on the government’s interest in safety.348 While the govern-
ment claims its safety concerns were independent of any message
expressed, Zalewska never had problems wearing a skirt before the
new dress code was imposed.349 Moreover, she ordered a skirt from
the private vendor supplying the uniforms and wore it without inci-
dent for three weeks after the new dress code was imposed.350 The
government might legitimately decide to institute new safety require-
ments in the workplace, but consistent with my interpretation of
O’Brien, the court should consider whether the requirements single
out specific conduct because it communicates a particular message.351
Even if Zalewska’s dress was recognized as communicative, the court
might still have upheld the dress code by balancing the government’s
interest in safety against Zalewska’s expression. However, the court
did not even reach this question because it treated Zalewska’s dress
as non-communicative.
2. Government Penalizes Gender Nonconforming Employees
Even without reference to specific dress codes, government em-
ployers often penalize gender nonconformity by transgender em-
ployees.352 As demonstrated in my discussion of Schroer,353 alleged
government interests in these cases ultimately center on gender non-
conformity as communicative. Schroer is part of a broader pattern of
penalizing gender nonconformity in order to suppress communication.
Jimmie Smith worked as a Lieutenant in the Salem Fire Depart-
ment for seven years before being diagnosed with gender identity
347. Id.
348. Id. at 322.
349. Id. at 317.
350. Id. at 318.
351. See supra notes 203–56 (arguing that the government should not be allowed to
use means that suppress the communicative nature of conduct).
352. See Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293, 300 (D.D.C. 2008); Smith v. City
of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573–74 (6th Cir. 2004).
353. Schroer, 577 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
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disorder.354 In preparation for transitioning from male to female,
Jimmie Smith began “expressing a more feminine appearance on a
full-time basis.” 355 Smith informed Thomas Eastek, his immediate
supervisor, of his transition plans after Smith’s coworkers began
commenting that Smith’s mannerisms and appearance were not
“masculine enough.” 356 Instead of supporting Jimmie, Eastek in-
formed city officials of Smith’s planned transition.357 Intending to
terminate Smith on the basis of his transgender status, city officials
required Smith to undergo psychological evaluations by three physi-
cians of the city’s choosing.358 The city hoped that Smith would either
resign or refuse to comply.359 Smith threatened legal action in re-
sponse to the city’s plan and alleged that a subsequent twenty-four-
hour suspension was in retaliation for obtaining an EEOC “right to
sue” letter.360
This case illustrates how any gender nonconformity can be
penalized, even before an employee presents himself or herself as
transgender. The other firefighters’ initial concerns were a reaction
to Smith’s gender ambiguity.361 Smith’s conduct communicated gen-
der nonconformity, even if it did not neatly fit an identity rubric.362
While Smith planned to transition genders, this reaction to gender
ambiguity would raise similar concerns if Smith only intended to
express nonconformity with masculine norms.363 The fire department
ultimately acted because Smith’s conduct violated the gender bi-
nary, requiring men to present themselves in a traditionally mascu-
line fashion. While the fire department did not cite any dress code
or appearance standards, they understood Smith’s appearance as
communicating a message of gender nonconformity.364 Using psycho-
logical tests underscores how the department considered this to be
a deviant message.365
In a similar case, Phillip Barnes (now Philecia) began his career
with the Cincinnati Police Department in 1981.366 In 1998, Barnes
354. Smith, 378 F.3d at 568. The Sixth Circuit held that Smith presented a prima facie
case of sex discrimination under Title VII and remanded to the district court for further
action. Id. at 578.
355. Id. at 568 (internal quotation marks omitted).
356. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 569.
359. Id.
360. Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 569 (6th Cir. 2004).
361. See id. at 568.
362. See id.
363. See id.
364. Id. at 566.
365. See id. at 569.
366. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2005).
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passed a promotion exam to become a Sergeant.367 As part of the pro-
motion, he began a probation period.368 Although the probation period
was designed to allow supervision of new sergeants and decide if the
promotion should stand, no other person had failed the probation
period since 1993.369 At the time of the promotion, Barnes had not
yet transitioned in the workplace but lived as a woman outside of
work.370 Many people in the police department knew of Barnes’s gen-
der identity outside of work.371 During the probation period, Barnes
was marked down for lack of “command presence.” 372 A month into
the probation period, Barnes was placed in a “Sergeant Field Training
Program,” where he was under video surveillance and evaluated daily
by different lieutenants.373 Barnes was the only sergeant placed in
this program, despite at least one other sergeant on probation who
had lower evaluations than Barnes.374 Some testimony suggested that
Barnes was placed in this program specifically to ensure he failed
probation.375 Barnes was demoted at the end of his probation period,
based on his poor performance.376
Command presence is a legitimate concern for a police depart-
ment.377 A police sergeant must command the respect of officers.378
However, here the police department’s assessment of Barnes’s com-
mand presence at least partially relied on how Barnes’s conduct vio-
lated social gender norms.379 Barnes had similar evaluation marks
to other sergeants.380 What distinguished Barnes from other ser-
geants was his gender nonconformity.381 Barnes’s femininity came
to be seen as a mark of deviance and weakness, and as a lack of com-
mand presence. Strength became a masculine trait. When the police
department singled out Barnes, it did so because of the social mean-
ing of his gender performance.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 735.
370. Id. at 733.
371. Id. at 734 (“Barnes was living off-duty as a woman, had a French manicure, had
arched eyebrows and came to work with makeup or lipstick on his face on some occasions.”).
372. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
373. Id.
374. Id. at 737.
375. Id. at 734.
376. Id. at 735.
377. Id. at 734.
378. Barnes v. City of Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2004).
379. See id. at 738.
380. Id. at 735.
381. See id. at 733.
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Transgender employees are also fired based on their refusal to
use the restroom associated with their anatomical sex.382 I discuss
these cases in detail later in this paper, arguing that restroom choice
expresses a message of gender identity. Here I only note that gov-
ernment regulations of gender nonconformity do not only arise in
the context of appearance and dress.
3. Arguments Against Protecting Gender Nonconformity in
Government Employment
There are at least three objections that might be raised to pro-
tecting gender nonconformity in the workplace. First, the govern-
ment’s interest in professional appearance is allegedly not related
to any messages that clothing and appearance might communicate.
The implicit argument is that dress codes do not suppress commu-
nication because fashion is trivial and does not communicate any-
thing.383 In Zalewska, the court held that plaintiff’s desire to wear
a dress did not rise to the level of speech because it did not commu-
nicate any specific message.384
Even if professional appearance is a legitimate governmental
interest, present law incorporates conventional gender norms into
the definition of professional.385 By singling out gender nonconfor-
mity as “unprofessional,” dress codes suppress conduct because it ex-
presses a message. Diane Schroer did not argue that the Library of
Congress should not be allowed to implement a professional dress
code.386 She did not seek any exemptions from general professional
appearance.387 The photos that Schroer showed to Preece were of
herself dressed in women’s professional clothing.388 Schroer argued
that she should be allowed to dress as a woman while at work.389 The
Library of Congress did not penalize Schroer for a trivial fashion
382. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1227 (10th Cir. 2007) (con-
cerning a male to female transgender employee who was fired when she refused to use
men’s restrooms); Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F.2d 1284, 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (same); Kastl
v. Maricopa Cnty. Cmty. Coll. Dist., No. Civ. 02-1531PHX-SRB, 2004 WL 2008954 (D.
Ariz. 2004) (same).
383. For a general discussion of appearance as trivial at work, see supra notes 332, 338.
384. Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 323 (2d Cir. 2003).
385. Cf. Bartlett, supra note 291, at 2543–45 (arguing courts generally use commu-
nity norms incorrectly to legitimate employer dress codes); Robert Post, Prejudicial
Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1, 29–30
(2000) (illustrating how conventional gender norms are incorporated into Title VII analysis).
386. Schroer v. Billington, 577 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2008).
387. Id.
388. Id. at 297.
389. Id. at 305.
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message (“I like to wear dresses”), but for a message of gender non-
conformity (“I am a woman”). Following my interpretation of O’Brien,
government employers should not be able to enforce dress codes in
a way that specifically suppresses gender nonconformity.
Second, some parties argue that gender nonconformity inter-
feres with workplace efficiency. Charlotte Preece claimed that Diane
Schroer would be distracted by her gender transition and would not
appear credible to Congress.390 As an employer, the government has
a legitimate interest in workplace efficiency.391 Gender nonconfor-
mity, however, only raises “efficiency” concerns because the conduct
communicates a message. If the government could always assert work-
place efficiency as independent of the communicative nature of con-
duct, it could defeat any employee free speech claims. Instead, courts
balance the employee’s interest in speech against the government’s
interest in workplace efficiency.392 Even if Zalewska’s dress had been
recognized as communicative, the government could have still argued
that it interfered with her duties as a van driver.393 Courts should
first recognize gender nonconformity as communicative, and only
then engage in appropriate case-by-case balancing of interests.
Finally, the government might argue that it should be allowed to
restrict gender nonconformity based on concern with client/customer
interaction. In Etsitty, the Utah Transit Authority required a male-
to-female transgender bus driver to use the men’s restrooms while
on her bus route, based on concerns with passenger interactions.394
According to this argument, third parties are uncomfortable with
transgender employees.395 Government as employer shares a con-
cern with private employers that dress codes influence productivity
and public image.396 Courts generally defer to employer dress codes
based on this concern with employer ability to control their public
image.397 However, under the Pickering balancing test, general con-
cerns about public image and dress codes should not defeat free
390. Id. at 297–98.
391. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
392. See supra notes 326–32 (discussing balancing test and criticisms).
393. Zalewska v. Cnty. of Sullivan, 316 F.3d 314, 317 (2d Cir. 2003).
394. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
395. For example, the police department of the Village of Peotone claimed that the
public would not respect the whole police department if male police officers were allowed
to wear earrings. Rathert v. Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1990).
396. See Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of Antidis-
crimination Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling
at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369, 379, n.33 (2007) (discussing studies that
show dress codes are related to productivity, professionalism, and company image).
397. Id. at 372.
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speech claims for gender nonconformity.398 As long as they do not in-
terfere with the workplace, government employees retain their fun-
damental free speech interests in autonomy and self-definition.399
B. Gender Nonconformity and Child Custody
When Carol Pulliam and Frederick Smith divorced in 1991, Smith
had primary physical custody of their children.400 After Smith’s boy-
friend moved in with him in 1994, Pulliam challenged the custody
order.401 In granting full custody to the mother, the court noted various
concerns, including that the two men kissed in front of the children,
the two men had oral sex (in a closed bedroom) while the children
were home (in their bedroom), and the father’s partner kept photos
of drag queens at their house.402 Regardless of other issues, the focus
on the photos of drag queens is a problematic suppression of speech.
The opinion never suggests that the children actually saw the photos
of the drag queens.403 Moreover, the court describes the photos as
“improper sexual material.” 404 The opinion does not suggest that the
drag queens were unclothed or engaged in sex.405 Instead, the con-
cern with improper sexual material equates gender nonconformity
with a message of deviance.
As illustrated in Pulliam, courts typically decide whether it is
in a child’s best interests to be exposed to a particular message with
no consideration for parental speech rights.406 Custody decisions pe-
nalizing gender nonconformity are one instance of this judicial will-
ingness to decide child custody cases based on the message expressed
by parental conduct. While the courts should be able to protect the
best interests of the child, they should not be able to do so in a way
that penalizes parents for expression of a specific message. Following
my interpretation of O’Brien,407 singling out gender nonconformity
should be an impermissible means of determining the best interests
of the child because it penalizes communication.
398. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
399. See id. at 572–73.
400. Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d. 898, 900 (N.C. 1998).
401. Id. at 900–03.
402. Id. at 903. The discussion of same-sex intimacy is problematic because it does not
appear to be any more than would be expected of straight parents. My concern is gender
nonconformity, so I do not deal with this issue.
403. Id.
404. Id. at 904.
405. Id.
406. See Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions,
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 643 (2006).
407. See supra notes 203–12 and accompanying text.
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1. Broader Issue: Best Interest Standard and Parental Speech
Courts have imposed some narrow limits on judicial discretion
in determining the best interest of the child. In Palmore v. Sidoti,
the Supreme Court overturned a trial court decision to award cus-
tody to the father based on the mother’s interracial marriage.408
Although it noted “that a child living with a stepparent of a different
race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses,” the Court
held that under the Fourteenth Amendment, “the law cannot, di-
rectly or indirectly, give [private biases] effect.” 409 Similarly, some
state courts do not allow judges to restrict parental religious speech
merely based on the best interests of the child.410 Instead, in these
states, judges can only restrict religious teachings if there is evi-
dence that they are likely to cause substantial emotional harm to
the child.411
Despite these narrow limits, the best interest standard grants
substantial discretion to judges deciding child custody cases.412 The
judicial discretion under this standard has been upheld as necessary
in a difficult area of family law,413 and criticized as inviting judicial
408. 466 U.S. 429, 431 (1984).
409. Id. at 433.
410. Volokh, supra note 406, at 635 n.8.
411. Id. at 648. For further discussion of religion and child custody decisions, see Donald
L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and
Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 (1989); Carl E. Schneider, Essay, Religion
and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879 (1992).
412. See Lynne Marie Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child
Standard in American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 339 (2008) (“[U]nbridled
judicial discretion became the pattern for best interests decision-making post-1960 when
states passed broad welfare of the child statutes, providing judges simply with lists of
factors, and otherwise vague allusions to judicial discretion for what is best for any given
child under any given circumstances.”). Forty-five states use some version of the best in-
terest standard. Id. at 338 n.5 (noting that 38 states provide specific factors while seven
leave best interest entirely to judicial discretion). The best interest standard is also used
in other custody issues, including grandparent custody, third party custody, and changes
in custody arrangements.
413. Scholars recognize family law as one of the most indeterminate areas of the law.
This indeterminacy may allow courts to adapt the law to changing family structures and
social demands, but also provides the possibility of judicial bias and improper decisions.
Kimberly Richman suggests this indeterminacy should be considered a “double-edged
sword,” providing lesbian and gay parents room to argue for their inclusion under existing
law, but allowing in judicial bias as well. See KIMBERLY D. RICHMAN, COURTING CHANGE:
QUEER PARENTS, JUDGES, AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN FAMILY LAW 1–12
(2009). Similarly, Steven Peskind recognizes the criticisms of the best interest standard
and argues for improving it, but ultimately concludes that the best interest standard is
the best way to balance the competing interests involved in custody; see Steven N. Peskind,
Determining the Undeterminable: The Best Interest of the Child Standard as an Imperfect
but Necessary Guidepost to Determining Child Custody, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 449 (2005).
Various state supreme courts have held that the best interest of the child standard is not
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bias and inappropriate use of irrelevant factors.414 Because these de-
cisions are only reviewed for abuse of discretion, trial courts’ deci-
sions typically stand.415 Although statutes and case law do contain
factors that judges should consider, in practice the best interest
standard leaves considerable room for courts to consider parental
ideology and speech in making custody decisions.416 This is particu-
larly true in states that include “moral fitness” as a factor in the
best interest calculus.417
Even when courts explicitly consider parental speech in making
custody decisions, it is rarely the only factor considered.418 In any
given case, courts might arrive at the same custody decision with-
out parental speech. For example, while Pulliam v. Smith discussed
the photos of drag queens, the opinion also noted that “on at least
two (2) occasions [the father] struck the [child] on or about the
head . . . .” 419 These non-speech factors may appear to provide non-
speech-based reasoning.
Nonetheless, when parental speech is considered, it may be the
deciding factor in a case. Despite evidence of the father striking the
child on at least two occasions, the father might have retained cus-
tody of the children if the Pulliam court did not consider the message
expressed by his homosexuality and photos of drag queens. Outside
unconstitutionally vague. See, e.g., Seymour v. Seymour, 433 A.2d 1005 (Conn. 1980)
(finding that a statute giving the district court wide discretion to determine best interests
of the child is not unconstitutionally vague); Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo.
1993) (finding that a statute allowing trial court to grant visitation rights to grandparents
based on best interests of the child is not unconstitutional); Harrold v. Collier, 836 N.E.2d
1165 (Ohio 2005) (finding that non-parental visitation statutes based on best interests
of the child are constitutional). See also Doe v. Doe, 172 P.3d 1067 (Haw. 2007) (recogniz-
ing validity of best interest of child standard as related to determining constitutionality
of grandparent visit statute).
414. See, e.g., RICHMAN, supra note 413, at 8 (arguing that anti-gay bias has histori-
cally been used to discriminate against lesbian, gay, and transgender parents under the
best interest standard); Stephen Parker, The Best Interests of the Child: Principles and
Problems, in THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: RECONCILING CULTURE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 26 (Philip Alston ed., 1994) (criticizing general vagueness of the best interest
doctrine); Volokh, supra note 406, at 637–40 (arguing that best interest standard allows
inappropriate consideration of parental ideology).
415. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Fletcher, 526 N.W.2d 889, 893 (Mich. 1994) (“[A] custody award
should be affirmed unless it represents an abuse of discretion. While the abuse of dis-
cretion standard is strict, it does not afford trial courts unfettered discretion in awarding
custody. The court’s exercise of that discretion is already limited by the statutory best
interest factors . . . .”).
416. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 646–49 (emphasizing how the best interest stan-
dard leaves room for courts to consider parental ideology).
417. Id. at 637 n.26.
418. E.g., Ex parte D.W.W., 717 So.2d 793, 794–97 (Ala. 1998) (upholding limitations
on maternal visitation that required the mother’s lesbian partner not be present, also
noting the mother’s violent behavior and the mother’s weak relationship with the child).
419. Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d. 898, 901 (N.C. 1998).
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the child custody context, free speech doctrine generally prevents
courts from using constitutionally protected speech as any element
in a decision because of the difficulty in determining what role speech
played in a multifactored decision.420 When courts can consider speech
as any element in a decision, it has a chilling effect on that speech. For
example, if a parent knows that family courts will consider religion
in deciding custody, the parent may avoid teaching his or her child
about a non-traditional religion in which the parent believes. Thus,
parents’ speech is restricted even without the court ever formally
considering religion in a custody decision.421
Custody decisions might act as restrictions on parental speech
in several ways. Courts might order parents not to say certain things
in order to retain full or partial custody. For example, courts have
ordered parents not to use racist language, not to expose children to
sexual content, not to discuss Communism or other political issues,
and not to expose children to pro-LGBT literature.422 Courts might
order parents not to expose their children to certain speech by
others.423 For example, courts have ordered parents not to bring
children to certain religious services,424 and courts have ordered par-
ents not to allow their partner to sleep in their bed when the child
is home.425 Courts might order parents to say certain things to their
children, or courts might restrict custody based on parental failure
to teach certain ideas to their children.426 Finally, courts might re-
strict custody based on what a parent is likely to say to a child.427
Arguably, parental ideology is properly considered in determining
the best interests of the child. In McCorvey,428 the child may well have
420. See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 915–16 (1982)
(overturning state court that improperly imposed liability based on combination of non-
violent boycott—protected by the First Amendment—and violence); Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977) (holding that school board de-
cision to fire teacher based on protected speech is unconstitutional unless the school
board could show that it would have reached same decision in the absence of the pro-
tected speech).
421. This draws on Palmore to develop the principle that societal disapproval of paren-
tal speech is an illegitimate means for custody decisions. This principle should apply at
any level of review. Cleburne endorses this reasoning. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985). Garrett insists that Cleburne was based on “the mini-
mum rational-basis review.” Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 366 (2001).
422. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 651–52.
423. See id.
424. E.g., Feldman v. Feldman, 874 A.2d 606, 614 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005)
(preventing mother from bringing child to Catholic Church).
425. Ex parte J.M.F., 730 So.2d 1190, 1194, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (targeting conduct based
on the court’s understanding of the message that it sends to the child).
426. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 652–53.
427. See id. at 653.
428. McCorvey v. McCorvey, 916 So.2d 357, 366 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
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been better off without hearing any racial slurs from her father.429
Children may or may not benefit from learning their parents’ ideas
about religion430 or drag queens.431 Even if some true best interests
of the child depend on parental ideology, that leaves open whether
courts should be able to consider parental ideology in making these
custody decisions. To put the point more starkly: even if it is in a
child’s best interest to not be exposed to racial slurs, should a court
thus be able to use a custody decision to penalize parental use of ra-
cial slurs? I argue that courts should not be able to use custody deci-
sions to penalize parental gender nonconformity. Even accepting my
arguments, courts would still be able to consider other factors, like
parental fitness, that properly relate to the best interests of the child.
2. Government Penalizes Gender Nonconformity in
Child Custody
Like other forms of speech, courts have penalized gender non-
conformity in child custody decisions.432 By relying on gender non-
conformity in determining the best interests of the child, courts
single out particular conduct based on the message that it expresses.433
Three examples illustrate how child custody decisions are used in
practice to suppress communication of gender nonconformity.
In Magnuson v. Magnuson, the Washington Court of Appeals
granted custody to the cisgender mother based on the supposed
stability of her relationship with the child and the child’s best in-
terest.434 The court held that custody decisions could not be based on
a parent’s transgender status but affirmed the trial court’s decision
based on the needs of the child and the potential instability of the
parent-child relationship caused by the father’s planned transition
429. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 647 (discussing reasons it may be preferable for
a child to be raised by a nonracist parent).
430. See, e.g., Underhill v. Garcia, No. 261651, 2005 WL 3304120, *2 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005).
431. See Pulliam v. Smith, 501 S.E.2d. 898, 901 (N.C. 1998).
432. See, e.g., In re Marriage of D.F.D. and D.G.D., 862 P.2d 368 (Mont. 1993) (dis-
cussing trial court decision requiring father not to cross-dress during visitation with child).
433. In some cases, courts have also restricted custody based on a parent’s decision to
allow a child to undergo medically supervised gender transition. In these cases, the non-
custodial parent has argued that gender transition is not in the child’s best interest. See
Shannon P. Minter & Mara Keisling, The Role of Medical and Psychological Discourse
in Legal and Policy Advocacy for Transgender Persons in the United States, 14 J. GAY &
LESBIAN MENTAL HEALTH 145, 152–53 (2010). While a parent’s ability to provide proper
medical care for a child is properly part of the best interest standard, these decisions im-
properly focus on the message expressed by certain medical procedures.
434. Magnuson v. Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 67–68 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
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to a female gender identity.435 The majority opinion explained that
“[n]o one knows what is ahead[,] and [t]he impact of gender reas-
signment surgery on the children is unknown.” 436 A vigorous dis-
senting opinion argued that the majority considered the father’s
transgender status, even while claiming to prohibit such consider-
ation.437 The dissent noted that the trial court found that the parents
were equally fit in most respects, and, in fact, the father had previ-
ously been the primary caretaker.438 The only basis for the trial
court’s finding that the father’s relationship with the child might be
unstable was based on the father’s planned transition to female.439
While a legitimate concern with the parent-child relationship may
have formed part of the rationale for this decision, the majority also
penalized the unknown message conveyed by the father’s transition
to a female gender identity. The court thus restricted the father’s
parental rights based at least partially on the message conveyed by
gender nonconformity.
In Daly v. Daly, the court terminated the natural father’s vis-
itation rights and all other parental rights.440 The court found that
the child was at risk of serious physical, mental, or emotional injury
from any visitation with Suzanne after she transitioned from male to
female.441 As with the last case, the trial evidence suggests that the
decision was based at least partially on the court’s concern with the
message sent by gender nonconformity.442 The court explained, “that
there are children who are not able to accept a parent as a transsex-
ual[,]” 443 and further suggested “that Suzanne, in a very real sense,
has terminated her own parental rights as a father. It was strictly
Tim Daly’s choice to discard his fatherhood and assume the role of a
female who could never be either mother or sister to his daughter.” 444
The opinion describes this as a choice about certain conduct:
dressing as a woman, changing her name, undergoing sex reassign-
ment surgery.445 But this conduct only gains meaning because it
435. Id. at 67 (extending previous Washington case law that prevented trial courts
from considering a parent’s sexual preference in making custody decisions).
436. Id. at 66.
437. See id. at 68–69 (Kulik, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 216–58 and
accompanying text (arguing that the state cannot target transgender status without
targeting communication).
438. Id. at 68.
439. Id. at 68–69.
440. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 56 (Nev. 1986).
441. Id. at 59.
442. See id. at 57.
443. Id. at 58.
444. Id. at 59.
445. Id. at 57.
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communicates a message of gender nonconformity. A cisgender
woman choosing to get a breast augmentation or change her name
would presumably not face the same judicial scrutiny. The court was
concerned with Daly’s choice to express a message of gender noncon-
formity. But the court did more than just terminate Suzanne Daly’s
visitation rights. The court terminated all of Suzanne’s parental
rights.446 Not only would Suzanne lose the right to visitation in the
present, she would lose all future rights to petition for visitation
or other input into the child’s life.447 Even if the child would be
harmed by visitation with Suzanne in the present, the decision to
terminate all parental rights penalizes the message sent by Su-
zanne’s gender nonconformity.448
Finally, in M.B. v. D.W., the Court of Appeals of Kentucky af-
firmed a trial court decision to grant a stepfather adoption, termi-
nating the parental rights of the child’s biological father who had
transitioned and was living as a woman.449 The trial court’s decision
focused on emotional injury inflicted on the child by the father’s
female gender identity expression.450 “[The child] stated that she felt
‘abandoned,’ and that the worst part was ‘knowing that I did not
have a father . . . he’s a woman.’ ” 451 The trial court also considered
the child’s wishes to live with her stepfather and the failure of the
natural father to pay child support.452 The Court of Appeals held that
sexual reassignment surgery was not a per se reason to terminate
parental rights,453 but the court suggested that in the case of sexual
reassignment surgery, termination would be proper whenever a child
was uncomfortable with the parent’s new gender identity expres-
sion.454 As with previous cases, legitimate concerns about parent-
child relationship quality overlap with the courts’ willingness to
penalize parental conduct based on the message it expresses.455
These three cases share several features that illustrate the
concerns raised by judicial treatment of gender nonconformity in
446. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 56 (Nev. 1986).
447. See id. at 59. Termination of parental rights in the state of Nevada is defined in
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 128.110 (West 2011).
448. Critically, Suzanne offered to forego visitation rights in order to maintain paren-
tal rights. A dissenting opinion stressed this inconsistency in the majority opinion. Daly,
715 P.2d at 60–63 (Gunderson & Springer, dissenting).
449. M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 33 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
450. Id. at 36.
451. Id. at 35.
452. Id. at 36–37.
453. Id. at 38 (“Neither do we hold that a parent’s undergoing gender reassignment
is, in itself, grounds for such termination.”).
454. Id. at 37.
455. See M.B. v. D.W., 236 S.W.3d 31, 37 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).
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child custody cases. Most importantly, in all three cases, custody re-
strictions were at least partially used to suppress conduct that com-
municated gender nonconformity. Parent-child relationship quality
remains a valid concern, but courts should not use parental speech
as evidence of relationship quality. Courts should not impute evi-
dence based on their concerns with the parent’s expression of gender
nonconformity. These cases are related to the broader challenge of
protecting parental speech rights while preserving the best interest
of the child standard.456 I turn now to some challenges in protecting
gender nonconformity in child custody cases.
3. Arguments Against Protecting Gender Nonconformity in
Child Custody
Parental rights are generally a strong bar against state inter-
ference with how children are raised.457 In particular, outside of di-
vorce cases, the courts rarely regulate parental speech.458 Professor
Volokh examines several potential reasons why courts generally do
not regulate parental speech in intact families.459 He argues that
protecting parental speech rights is consistent both with preventing
the government from interfering with broader parents’ rights and
with preventing the government from restricting public discourse
and debate.460 As with any other speech, the government should not
be able to restrict child custody to suppress parental speech. While
the state might legitimately take custody away from parents based
on child abuse, it should not take custody away based on a parent’s
gender nonconformity.
Freedom of speech should similarly protect gender nonconfor-
mity in the case of divorced parents.461 Parental speech rights are
protected in intact families even when they might undermine the
best interests of the child.462 In divorce cases, the best interests stan-
dard should not be able to trump freedom of speech. Parents do not
456. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 631–32 (arguing that in almost all cases parental
speech rights can be protected without damaging the best interests of the child); see also
RICHMAN, supra note 413, at 1–12 (discussing related challenge of balancing parents’
claims to “rights” against best interests of the child).
457. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65–67 (2000) (holding that statute permit-
ting court to grant custody to grandmother based on best interest violated substantive
due process rights of mother).
458. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 673–74, nn.180–84 (arguing that the rare excep-
tion is cases where courts consider abusive parental speech as one element of child abuse).
459. Id. at 673–84 (describing this as an incompletely theorized agreement).
460. Id. at 631–32.
461. Volokh develops the comparison between speech in intact and separated families
in great detail. See id. at 683–99.
462. See id. at 686–87.
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give up their speech rights by divorcing.463 While courts have to de-
termine the best interests of the child, they should also continue to
protect the ability of parents, as opposed to the government, to de-
termine how to raise children.464
Mere conflict between parents over religious and ideological
teachings does not justify state intervention.465 For example, in
Magnuson, the biological father transitioned to a female gender
identity.466 By rejecting the gender binary, the father’s conduct
may have challenged the mother’s gender ideology. However, each
parent should maintain a right to free speech. While conflicting
messages may be challenging for children, this is no different from
intact families. Married parents may similarly teach conflicting
ideas to their children. Even when parents teach fundamentally
conflicting ideas to children, courts avoid restricting speech in in-
tact families.467 Similarly, in split families, conflict over gender iden-
tity expression should not be a basis for a court to restrict either
parent’s custody.
Several child custody cases mention potential psychological
harm to the child. In Daly, the court explained that the child might
be harmed by the father’s planned gender transition.468 Superficially,
this seems consistent with the best interest standard. However, this
is problematic because it allows courts to impute emotional injury
based on the court’s assumptions about the gender messages ex-
pressed by a parent. While the Magnuson court purported to decide
based on potential harm to the child, there was minimal evidence of
how the father’s transition would impact the child.469 Instead, as the
dissent vigorously pointed out, the court acted on its assumptions
about the father’s status as transgender.470 The court decision treated
gender nonconformity as deviant, simply assuming that it would harm
the child.471 Legal scholars argue that this is a problematic pattern
in custody cases: courts simply assume that any sort of sexual de-
viance will harm children without a showing of actual harm.472 In
463. See id. at 685–86 (noting, however, that divorced parents do not have exclusive
control over raising children because they must split that with the other parent).
464. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 687–89.
465. See id. at 689–94.
466. Magnuson v. Magnuson, 170 P.3d 65, 66 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007).
467. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 673–75.
468. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 58 (Nev. 1986).
469. See Magnuson, 170 P.3d at 66.
470. Id. at 68–69 (Kulik, J., dissenting).
471. See id.
472. See, e.g., Suzanne A. Kim, The Neutered Parent, 24 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 1, 1–2
(2012) (showing how focus on “normal” sexuality stands in for actual harm to children);
Nancy G. Maxwell & Richard Donner, The Psychological Consequences of Judicially
Imposed Closets in Child Custody and Visitation Disputes Involving Gay or Lesbian
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reality, psychological studies find that children fare worse when
parents are forced to hide part of their identity,473 and that children
of sexual minorities do not have worse psychological outcomes.474
In Palmore v. Sidoti, the Supreme Court held that child custody
decisions could not be based on societal prejudice against interracial
relationships.475 While the Court acknowledged the potential diffi-
culty the child would face, the Court stressed that under the Equal
Protection Clause, private biases could not be a basis for the law.476
Children of interracial parents could learn to deal with social prej-
udices.477 Eventually this could be better for the individual child, as
well as for society as a whole.478 Similarly, children with transgen-
der parents may or may not face social discrimination. But by basing
child custody decisions on anti-transgender prejudice, courts would
enforce private biases and potentially deny children the opportunity
to better understand gender.479
C. Gender Nonconformity and Restroom Access
On June 24, 2007, Khadijah Farmer wore jeans and a polo shirt,
and had her hair shaved very short.480 While Farmer is a cisgender
woman, her dress and hair were not traditionally feminine.481 Follow-
ing the Gay Pride Parade in New York City, Farmer and a female
companion went to Caliente Cab Company, a Mexican Restaurant.482
After they began eating, Farmer excused herself to use the women’s
restroom.483 As Farmer entered the women’s restroom, another patron
Parents, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 305, 305–06 (2006) (arguing that courts incor-
rectly rely on stereotypes to assume a parent’s sexuality will harm children).
473. See Maxwell & Donner, supra note 472, at 318–27 (summarizing research on the
damaging impact of parental secrets).
474. See id. at 327–30.
475. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434–35 (1984).
476. Id. at 433.
477. See Liana Nazaryan, Note, Interracial Adoption: Is a Colorblind Adoption a Good
Idea in a Color Conscious Society?, 23 J. JUV. L. 100, 106–08 (2002–2003).
478. See id. at 106.
479. See supra note 421 (arguing that Palmore should apply to all rational basis review).
As in Palmore, children may be exposed to dissenting views of parents when a cisgender
parent challenges a transgender parent. As much as possible, courts should respect both
parents’ continued rights to free speech. Narrow restrictions may be appropriate only to
protect against direct attacks on the other parent. See Volokh, supra note 406, at 697–99
(discussing these sorts of restrictions in detail).
480. Rich Schapiro, Lesbian Riled by Boot from Ladies Room, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 30,
2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/lesbian-riled-boot-ladies-room-article-1.224762.
481. Jennifer Lee, Woman Wins a Settlement Over Her Bathroom Ouster, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2008, at B3.
482. Id.
483. Id.
242 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 19:187
glared at Farmer, telling her “[t]his is the women’s bathroom.” 484
Farmer replied that she belonged in the women’s restroom.485 Farmer
was then removed from the restroom and the restaurant by a bouncer
who refused to believe that Farmer is a woman, despite her repeated
offers to present her identification.486 The bouncer acted on the basis
of Farmer’s short hair and masculine dress.487
Because this happened in a restaurant, it is not clear whether
a First Amendment challenge could be staged.488 I use this case be-
cause it illustrates how gender nonconformity is regularly penalized
in the restroom. In particular, this example emphasizes how gender
ambiguous women and men might be more severely penalized than
transgender people who pass.489
Restrooms seem like an odd place to make a free speech argu-
ment. Most people use the restroom several times a day and never
think about any message that might be sent by their restroom use.
When we see other people enter the restroom, we typically do not
understand their restroom use to communicate a message. Similarly,
we do not think of preventing (cisgender) men from using the women’s
restroom as being based on any gendered message. Instead, most
people think about sex-segregated restrooms in terms of privacy.490
While I think our cultural definition of privacy in some sense depends
484. Schapiro, supra note 480.
485. Id.
486. Lee, supra note 481.
487. See Schapiro, supra note 480.
488. The First Amendment does not directly apply to private restaurants, but might
be used in a challenge to any relevant state laws. Many state laws and local ordinances
require restaurants to segregate restrooms by sex. See, e.g., New York City Plumbing Code,
§ 403.1, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dob/downloads/pdf/plumbing_code.pdf (specifying num-
ber of restrooms required for each sex); 10 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 10, § 14-1.142
(assuming restrooms will be sex segregated). After being denied access to a restaurant’s
restrooms, a transgender plaintiff could sue the restaurant for a violation of sex antidis-
crimination law or a violation of state or local public accommodations laws. See, e.g.,
Freeman v. Realty Resources Hospitality, No. CV-09-199 (Me. Sup. Ct. May 27, 2010),
available at http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/freeman-v-dennys/2010-05-27-freeman
-superior-court-decision.pdf (order denying motion to dismiss) (allowing lawsuit under
Maine public accommodations law against Denny’s restaurant for violating Maine’s Human
Rights Act by discriminating on the basis of gender identity in restroom access). Freedom
of speech could be used to challenge the restaurant’s reliance on state law to justify rest-
room segregation. This would not prevent a restaurant from privately deciding to restrict
restroom access based on gender nonconformity, but would at least challenge the state law.
489. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., #1, 294 F.3d 981, 982–83 (8th Cir. 2002)
(plaintiff claimed male-to-female coworker in the women’s restroom created hostile work
environment, but plaintiff admitted that she had not even noticed coworker’s restroom
use for several months).
490. Tobias Wolff argues that much opposition to trans restroom access is based on
anxiety over exposure of the body. See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Civil Rights Reform and
the Body, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 201, 207 (2012).
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on gender norms, I am willing to accept that privacy might function
as a government interest independent of expression.491
Nonetheless, when the government penalizes transgender rest-
room access, its means suppress communication.492 As a matter of
free speech, the government should not be allowed to restrict access
to restrooms in order to suppress communication of gender noncon-
formity.493 Restroom choice is deliberate and intended to communi-
cate a central aspect of identity: “I am a woman,” or “I am a man.”
Even if most cisgender women never subjectively intend to commu-
nicate a message by using the women’s restroom, their conduct is
legible as communicating a nearly universal social norm. This be-
comes even clearer in the case of transgender restroom access. When
a transgender man begins using the men’s restroom, not only does
his conduct communicate his gender, but he consciously chooses to
do so in order to communicate his gender identity.494 When the govern-
ment restricts transgender restroom access, it uses an illegitimate
means to suppress gender nonconformity. This potentially radical
argument could reach any sex-segregated facilities. In practice, this
argument would not necessarily require dramatic changes. I do not
try to define the exact scope of the government’s interest in privacy
here, but insofar as privacy is culturally defined as distinct from
gender, the government might have a continued interest in sex-
segregated facilities for certain purposes.
1. Broader Issue: Sex-Segregated Restrooms
Laws first required sex-segregation of restrooms in the late
1880s.495 In response to growing concerns over women’s safety in the
workplace, these laws were attached to a wave of protective legis-
lation.496 Some restroom provisions were part of broader protec-
tions for all laborers, while others were attached to bills specifically
491. See infra Part II.C.3 (discussing privacy and safety rationales); see also Amy
Adler, Girls! Girls! Girls!: The Supreme Court Confronts the G-String, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1108, 1112 (2005) (suggesting that culture constrains the First Amendment).
492. See supra notes 203–56 and accompanying text (interpreting O’Brien).
493. This would protect any gender nonconformity. In Farmer’s case, Farmer may or
may not have thought about her restroom choice as speech. Nonetheless, the restaurant
targeted her restroom choice based on the message communicated. See supra notes 480–87
and accompanying text.
494. However, subjective intent to communicate a message is not required to protect
conduct as speech. See Waldman, supra note 188, at 1894.
495. Terry S. Kogan, Sex-Separation in Public Restrooms: Law, Architecture, and
Gender, 14 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 39 (2007) (Massachusetts adopted the first law
requiring sex-segregated restrooms in workplaces in 1887). Kogan discusses the history
of adoption of these laws and their original justifications. Id. at 39–50.
496. Id. at 39.
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designed to protect women and children.497 Terry Kogan identifies
four rationales underlying the legislative discussion of these laws:
(1) protecting women’s weaker bodies by giving them a place of re-
spite; (2) providing better sanitation by having adequate restrooms
for women; (3) protecting privacy, as understood by Victorian norms
of modesty; and (4) preserving a separate sphere for women on the
basis of morality.498 As suggested by these rationales, restrooms were
sex-segregated to benefit and protect women.
Sex-segregation of restrooms is now ingrained in our culture to
a point that questioning it seems radical. In the debates over a fed-
eral Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) in the 1970s, Phyllis Schlafly
and other ERA opponents used the specter of desegregating rest-
rooms to prevent passage of the ERA.499 ERA opponents did not need
to explain or justify their reference to restrooms; they relied on a
shared social understanding that restrooms are supposed to be sex-
segregated.500 Opponents of antidiscrimination bills have continued to
use this specter of restrooms, illustrating the continued assumption
that restrooms should be sex-segregated.501
With this seeming universal acceptance of the logic behind sex-
segregated restrooms, why challenge them? Does “bathroom discrim-
ination” 502 only matter to a small group of transgender individuals?
While my paper addresses bathroom discrimination in the trans-
gender context, the issue is much larger. Brief consideration of the
larger problems with sex-segregated restrooms will illustrate why
gendered laws are not as natural as assumed.
497. Id. at 39–40.
498. Id. at 41.
499. Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 139.
500. Id. at 140.
501. In recent years, as state legislatures have added trans protections to antidiscrim-
ination laws, this specter of the restroom has again come up. Anti-transgender activists
in Massachusetts labeled the state’s antidiscrimination law as “the bathroom bill.” Id.
at 141. This tactic has been repeated in many states across the country. See, e.g., Where
We Stand Today, NO BATHROOM BILL, http://www.nobathroombill.com/where-we-stand
-today/ (last updated Jan. 25, 2012). Based on this tactic, many states have explicitly ex-
cluded restrooms from their sex antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-
24-3.1 (1956) (“Nothing contained in this chapter that refers to ‘sex’ shall be construed to
mandate joint use of restrooms, bath houses, and dressing rooms by males and females.”).
Courts have also held that transgender antidiscrimination laws do not cover restroom
access. Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 143–44. But see id. at 150 (Maine courts re-
jected this logic). Despite this hysteria over restroom access, there are no reported cases
of activists using an antidiscrimination bill to gain access to restrooms. See Martha F.
Davis, The Equal Rights Amendment: Then and Now, 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 419,
445–46 (2008) (“An extensive search has revealed no case brought under any state ERA
challenging the norm of public single-sex bathrooms.”).
502. Levi & Redman suggest this term. Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 133.
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Under sex-segregated bathroom laws, a father technically can-
not assist his young daughter in a public restroom.503 A wife cannot
help her wheelchair-dependent husband in the restroom.504 A son
cannot aid his elderly mother.505 Sex-segregated restrooms are less
efficient than unisex restrooms and create longer lines.506 This is
particularly true when each restroom has a limited number of larger
handicapped stalls: handicapped stalls in one restroom go unused
while a line forms for the stalls in the other restroom. Sex-segregated
restroom laws can also lead to sanctions against gender ambiguity,
as illustrated by Farmer’s case.507 Finally, most transgender individ-
uals report frequent violence and intimidation when they use the
restroom.508 Some transgender individuals may not safely be able to
use either restroom.509
Mary Anne Case convincingly argues for unisex restrooms as the
ideal policy outcome.510 Unisex restrooms could be one-person rest-
rooms with locked exterior doors, or could be larger restrooms with
individual stalls. Because men and women would all use stalls, there
would be no loss of privacy. My free speech argument cannot reach
this broader policy argument for unisex restrooms.511 Nonetheless,
503. Kogan, supra note 495, at 4. In practice, parents frequently bring opposite-sex
infants and very young children into the restroom with them.
504. Id.
505. See id. at 3.
506. See Mary Anne Case, Why Not Abolish the Laws of Urinary Segregation?, in
TOILET: PUBLIC RESTROOMS AND THE POLITICS OF SHARING 211, 213 (Harvey Molotch &
Laura Norén eds., 2010).
507. Schapiro, supra note 480.
508. Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 136–37.
509. Id. at 137.
510. See Case, supra note 506. Alex More alternately suggests restrooms marked “other”
to accommodate transgender people. Alex More, Note, Coming Out of the Water Closet:
The Case Against Sex Segregated Bathrooms, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 297, 311 (2008).
More’s suggestion would require three sets of restrooms and seems less practical and less
normatively desirable. Restricting people to a unisex restroom (whether marked “unisex,”
“male and female,” “other,” or “decline to state”) would force them to “out” themselves by
preventing them from using the men’s and women’s restrooms. See PEEING IN PEACE,
supra note 59, at 12.
511. Freedom of speech prevents government from interfering with speech. Thus
freedom of speech could prevent government from penalizing transgender restroom
choices. Freedom of speech would not compel all restrooms be designated as unisex. It
also would not reach many of the problems with sex-segregated restrooms discussed
above. For example, a husband might wish to accompany his wheelchair dependent wife
into the restroom solely as a caregiver. Freedom of speech would also not reach cases
dealing with unequal provision of restrooms by sex. See, e.g., Wedow v. City of Kan. City,
442 F.3d 661, 671–72 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that failure to provide adequate restroom
and locker facilities to female fire fighters can constitute sex discrimination). Therefore,
while freedom of speech might seem like a weak tool for the problem of sex-segregated
restrooms, it would provide greater freedom of restroom choice to transgender individuals.
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this policy debate illuminates the relationship between gender ex-
pression and broader systems of social inequality.
2. Government Penalizes Gender Nonconformity in
Restroom Access
When bathroom discrimination occurs, the state is very often
involved in some capacity.512 Trans people regularly report police
abuse and harassment at public restrooms.513 Several transgender
activists have reported being harassed, whether they use the men’s
or women’s restroom.514 When arrests are made, police might charge
trans people with disorderly conduct, public indecency, or resisting
arrest.515 When police harass or arrest trans people for using the
restroom, the state quite violently suppresses gender nonconformity.
In addition to direct police enforcement, many states have laws or
regulations requiring public accommodations to have sex-segregated
restrooms.516 These laws might be part of liquor licensing laws,517
health and safety codes,518 or building519 and plumbing codes.520 Thus
the decision to sex-segregate restrooms is done in compliance with
state laws. Insofar as these laws can be read to prohibit restroom
choice by trans people, the government restricts speech.521
Finally, government employees have been fired based on con-
cerns about their restroom use. The Utah Transit Authority (UTA)
fired a transgender bus driver, claiming to be concerned with potential
512. Even if the state has a legitimate interest in the ends of safety and privacy, free-
dom of speech should be implicated if it uses means that suppress gender nonconformity
over other conduct. See supra notes 203–56 and accompanying text (interpreting O’Brien).
513. See PEEING IN PEACE, supra note 59, at 1–11 (discussing extent of bathroom dis-
crimination faced by transgender people).
514. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 270, at 68 (telling story of an MTF activist).
515. See Gehi, supra note 270, at 326.
516. See Kogan, supra note 495, at 39–40 (providing a history of sex-segregated rest-
room law).
517. See, e.g., TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE. ANN. § 61.43 (West 2003) (requiring “separate
free toilets for males and females, properly identified, on the premises”).
518. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 381.0091 (repealed 2011) (Florida public health law) (“If more
than one restroom is provided in any building or facility owned or operated by the state
or any political subdivision of the state, the restrooms for males shall be separate from
the restrooms for females.”).
519. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 326B.109 (West 2012) (“In a place of public accommo-
dation subject to this section, the ratio of water closets for women to the total of water
closets and urinals provided for men must be at least three to two, unless there are two
or fewer fixtures for men.”).
520. See, e.g., N.Y. CITY CHARTER & ADMIN. CODE ANN., § 403.1 (2008) (New York City
plumbing code) (specifying number of restrooms required for each sex).
521. Bringing a free speech claim against these laws would depend on how the laws
are enforced and interpreted. See supra note 488.
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liability for the employee’s use of women’s public restrooms while on
the job.522 Krystal Etsitty was anatomically male, but was diagnosed
with gender identity disorder and had transitioned to female.523 When
she refused to comply with UTA requests that she use men’s restrooms
while on the job, she was fired.524 If Etsitty’s dress communicated her
gender nonconformity, then her restroom choice certainly communi-
cated gender nonconformity. By using women’s restrooms, Etsitty
challenged the gender binary. She communicated the message that
trans women should use the same restrooms as cisgender women.
It is precisely this message that the state penalized. Moreover, had
Etsitty complied with the request to use the men’s restroom, the
government would have compelled her to send an alternate gender
message.525 Just as the state cannot penalize Etsitty’s gender expres-
sion by firing her based on her dress, it cannot compel her to send
a different gendered message in order to be allowed to use the rest-
room. Use of the restroom cannot be conditioned on particular speech.
The UTA may have allowed Etsitty to dress as a woman and other-
wise present herself as a woman, but when it came to the restroom,
UTA demanded that Etsitty express a male identity.526
How do we know that the state reacts to gender nonconformity
instead of anatomical sex? While UTA might argue that it merely
required Etsitty to use the restroom consistent with her anatomical
sex, actual enforcement of restroom sex-segregation is not based on
anatomical sex.527 Even when trans people are questioned in their
restroom use, nobody demands to see their genitals to determine
which restroom they should use.528 Instead trans people are ques-
tioned because their gender expression is non-normative.
522. Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1219 (10th Cir. 2007).
523. Id. at 1218.
524. Id. at 1226 (dismissing sex-stereotyping claim by explaining “Etsitty was terminated
not because she failed to conform to stereotypes about how a man should act and appear,
but because she was a biological male who intended to use women’s public restrooms”).
525. See supra notes 258–65 and accompanying text (discussing compelled speech
problems).
526. See also Glenn v. Brumby, 724 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1307 (N.D. Ga. 2010) aff’d, 663
F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2011) (holding that Georgia General Assembly Legislative Counsel
had valid interest in dismissing transgender employee based on concerns with potential
harassment claims brought by women over employee’s use of women’s restrooms); Michaels
v. Akal Sec., Inc., No. 09-CV-01300-ZLW-CBS, 2010 WL 2573988, *1 (D. Colo. June 24,
2010) (transgender federal courthouse employee placed on involuntary leave after an-
other employee complained about her restroom use).
527. Moreover, even if UTA were to base its actions solely on Etsitty’s anatomical sex,
this still suppresses her communication of gender nonconformity.
528. See West & Zimmerman, supra note 121, at 132 (“Neither initial sex assignment
(pronouncement at birth as a female or male) nor the actual existence of essential
criteria for that assignment (possession of a clitoris and vagina or penis and testicles)
has much—if anything—to do with the identification of sex category in everyday life.”).
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When a trans person enters a restroom, if they are even recog-
nized as trans, others understand the gender message expressed by
their restroom choice. Carla Cruzan, a teacher at Southwest High
School in Minnesota, challenged the school’s decision to allow a trans-
gender teacher to use the women’s restroom.529 Cruzan encountered
Davis (the transgender teacher) exiting a stall in the women’s rest-
room.530 Cruzan immediately exited the women’s restroom to com-
plain to the principal and later sued the school district for allowing
Davis to use the women’s restrooms.531
Cruzan’s reaction was based on the message communicated by
restroom choice. Cruzan did not argue that Davis must meet certain
medical criteria in order to use the women’s restroom. As far as
Cruzan was concerned, Davis could never use the women’s restroom.
Cruzan’s discrimination claims particularly reveal how she under-
stands Davis’s restroom use as offensive speech.
Cruzan claimed that the school district discriminated against
her religious beliefs by allowing Davis to use the women’s restroom.532
In order for this theory to make sense, Cruzan must recognize Davis’s
use of the restroom as speech: “Cruzan asserts that her religious
beliefs do not permit her to share a private facility, such as a rest-
room, with members of the opposite sex.” 533 Cruzan’s complaint is
about more than privacy or discomfort. It is more than anti-trans
discrimination. Cruzan’s complaint alleges that Davis’s conduct di-
rectly challenges her beliefs. Cruzan’s religious beliefs incorporate
the gender binary, the ideology that men and women are fundamen-
tally different and sex is fixed at birth.534 Davis’s use of the women’s
restroom was an act of self-definition. It defined and expressed her
identity as a woman, and it challenged the gender binary. Cruzan
necessarily understood Davis’s restroom use in these ideological
terms, as a challenge to her understanding of the gender binary.
529. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., # 1, 294 F.3d 981, 982–83 (8th Cir. 2002). David
Nielsen began working for the school district in 1969. Id. at 983. In 1998, he informed
the district that he was transgender and would begin presenting himself as Debra Davis.
Id. The district worked with Davis to accommodate her gender transition. Id. During
discussions to prepare for Davis’s transition, Cruzan objected to the possibility of Davis
using the women’s restroom. Id. The school district initially decided that Davis would
use alternate restrooms, but the school district’s legal counsel later informed the district
that Minnesota antidiscrimination law might require them to allow Davis to use the
women’s restroom. Id. Cruzan was not informed of this change and did not learn of Davis’s
use of the women’s restroom until she encountered Davis in the women’s restroom. Cruzan
v. Minn. Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 165 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (D. Minn. 2001).
530. Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., #1, 294 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 2002).
531. Id. (claiming religious discrimination and hostile work environment sex dis-
crimination).
532. Id. at 982–83.
533. Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 967.
534. See supra notes 105–08 and accompanying text (describing gender binary).
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This ideological construction of Davis’s restroom use becomes even
clearer when considering Cruzan’s typical use of a different rest-
room from Davis.
Cruzan claimed that the school district created a hostile work
environment by allowing Davis to use the women’s restroom.535
Cruzan never claimed to be physically threatened by Davis; in fact,
Cruzan acknowledged that she was not even aware of Davis’s use of
the women’s faculty restroom for several months.536 Cruzan used the
girl’s restroom at another end of the campus, a restroom not used by
Davis.537 Thus, Cruzan claimed she was threatened if Davis was
allowed to use any women’s restroom.538 Because Cruzan primarily
used a different restroom and rarely directly interacted with Davis,
Cruzan was not threatened in any way by Davis’s actual restroom
practices.539 Cruzan did not claim to be harassed or endangered.540
Instead, Cruzan essentially alleged that the school district supported
an ideology inconsistent with her beliefs about the gender binary.
Cruzan felt threatened by the idea of a transgender woman using
the women’s restroom. Cruzan’s meritless hostile work environment
claim is thus based on Cruzan’s reaction to the message expressed by
Davis’s restroom use.
I now turn to the privacy and safety concerns underlying sex-
segregated restrooms (and other public facilities). While these concerns
should not allow the government to suppress gender nonconformity,
I do not argue that the government should never be able to enforce
sex-segregated restrooms.
3. Arguments Against Protecting Gender Nonconformity in
Restroom Access
While I believe unisex restrooms are the ideal policy solution,
I am not prepared to argue that freedom of speech requires them.
What is different about a cisgender man and a trans woman using
the women’s restroom? Even if the cisgender man does not intend
to express a gender message by using the women’s restroom, subjec-
tive intent should not be required to protect conduct as speech. Sex-
segregated restrooms are such a universal norm in our society that
535. Cruzan, 165 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
536. Id. at 969.
537. Id. at 968.
538. See Cruzan v. Special Sch. Dist., #1, 294 F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2002).
539. This is consistent with both the district and appellate courts, which rejected
Cruzan’s claim noting that she did not see Davis using the restroom. Id. at 984; Cruzan,
165 F. Supp. 2d at 968.
540. See Cruzan, 294 F.3d at 984.
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both of their conduct would be understood as communicative. The
difference must lie in the state’s interests. Sex-segregated restrooms
are most firmly based on privacy and safety. I turn to each of these jus-
tifications to argue that when the state targets transgender restroom
use, it uses illegitimate means of targeting gender nonconformity.
Safety is probably the most common argument in favor of sex-
segregated restrooms. Assuming for the sake of argument that sex-
segregation of restrooms is rationally related to safety, preventing
trans people from using sex-segregated restrooms is not related to
safety. Typically, this argument is presented thus: allowing trans
women in the women’s restroom is a threat to women and children.541
Opponents of trans restroom access suggest that trans women are
really male sexual predators.542 There is no evidence, however, that
trans restroom access poses any real threat to safety.543 Moreover,
sex-segregated restrooms do not prevent cisgender male sexual pred-
ators from entering women’s restrooms. Even if there were potential
safety concerns, free speech theory would not support restricting
restroom access for all trans persons based on these concerns. While
speech can be restricted based on “true threats,” the hypothetical
possibility of harm is not a sufficient reason to restrict speech.544 In
the restroom example, it is worth remembering that various other
sources of law address the concerns of safety. If a male sexual pred-
ator were to actually pose as a trans woman, any violence committed
would not be “speech.” Even actual spoken words are not protected
speech when they are equivalent to an act of violence.545 Thus, this
safety argument for strict sex-segregation of restrooms fails on two
grounds. First, as a practical matter, there is no evidence that pre-
venting trans people from using their restroom of choice actually
enhances safety.546 Second, as a matter of freedom of speech, the
possibility of harm is insufficient to restrict speech.
541. See, e.g., Case, supra note 506, at 9 (discussing this claim).
542. See Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 137.
543. Id. at 160 (noting that even in San Francisco there are no reported cases of trans
women harassing cis women).
544. For example, Virginia could constitutionally prohibit cross-burning when the
statute targets conduct that is specifically intended to communicate a threat. Virginia v.
Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“ ‘True threats’ encompass those statements where the
speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of un-
lawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”). Similarly, a federal
statute criminalizing true threats against the President is constitutional, but a man’s
comment that “[i]f [the Army] ever [made] me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in
my sights is L.B.J.” was political hyperbole and not a true threat. Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969). Trans persons do not intend to threaten others by using the
restroom and their conduct cannot be classified as a “true threat.”
545. See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (noting that words that incite violence or incite a
breach of the peace are punishable by the states).
546. Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 161.
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Privacy arguments similarly fail on both practical and theoreti-
cal grounds. There is a well-established reasonable expectation of
privacy in public restrooms.547 Many courts use this as the basis for
a same-sex privacy bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) un-
der Title VII.548 Privacy in a public restroom is meant to protect others
from viewing someone in a state of partial undress.549 This privacy
expectation is not absolute: multiple people can use a public restroom
at the same time. Our notions of privacy are culturally constructed:
we assume that being seen by members of the opposite sex is a greater
violation of privacy than being seen by members of the same sex.550
Underlying this notion of privacy is a general discomfort with the
idea of sharing restrooms with members of the opposite sex.
Surely our understanding of privacy is culturally constructed
and can change over time. For example, anxieties over the body and
privacy partially drove opposition to both racially integrated swim-
ming pools and shared barracks and showers in the repeal of Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.551 Anxiety over loss of privacy from trans people using
restrooms may dissipate over time. Nonetheless, the state may at
least have a rational interest in sex-segregated restrooms to accom-
modate cultural understandings of privacy. Sex-segregated restrooms
do not perfectly serve this goal of privacy, but in many applications
they seem at least related.
Whatever rational interest in privacy may exist, it does not
justify singling out and suppressing gender nonconformity. Rest-
room choice is a powerful act of self-definition. Trans people often
very consciously choose to use a particular restroom in order to
define and express their identity. Their masculinity or femininity is
547. See Michael R. Flaherty, Annotation, Search and Seizure: Reasonable Expectation
of Privacy in Public Restroom, 74 A.L.R. 4th 508 (1989) (discussing extent of reasonable
expectation of privacy against police surveillance in a public restroom).
548. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
(upholding the employer’s right to deny a female employee a position cleaning men’s
bathrooms in a client’s building because fundamental privacy rights were implicated);
Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 1122, 1132 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (finding that “while
using any of the bathhouses, the male employees had legitimate privacy rights that would
have been violated by a female’s entering and performing janitorial duties therein during
their use thereof, and to protect those rights, those male employees were entitled to in-
sist that defendant not assign plaintiff to do so.”). But see Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-
Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1260 (2003)
(arguing that the same-sex privacy BFOQ almost always violates the meaning of Title VII).
549. Thus, for example, Kapczynski suggests that it would be appropriate to require
an opposite sex janitor to knock on a bathroom door before cleaning the bathroom, to
ensure that the janitor did not accidentally see someone using the bathroom in a state
of partial undress. See Kapczynski, supra note 548, at 1271–72.
550. Id. at 1277.
551. See Wolff, supra note 490, at 203, 217–20, 227–30.
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constituted through the very act of using the restroom.552 The anxi-
ety many cisgender people feel in response is a clear signal that they
understand the communication of gender nonconformity. Our con-
cern with the autonomy value of free speech should force us to think
carefully about this. Moreover, most trans people try to avoid draw-
ing attention to themselves in public restrooms.553 Like most other
people, trans people simply want to use the restroom.554 The only
invasion of privacy is the idea of being uncomfortable about sharing
a restroom with a transgender person.555 Even if some cisgender
women might feel uncomfortable with the message expressed, free
speech prohibits the government from regulating expressive conduct
based on the discomfort of the audience.556
While proponents of sex-segregated restrooms claim to protect
safety and privacy, they ignore the safety and privacy of transgender
people.557 For example, in Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., the court ex-
plained, “the company made a good faith effort to determine which
facilities were appropriate for Plaintiff, but left with her counsel’s
ambiguous response, was forced to rely on the unequivocal informa-
tion provided on her drivers’ license.” 558 The court held that “the com-
pany only required Plaintiff to conform to the accepted principles
established for gender-distinct public restrooms,” 559 despite earlier
noting that Plaintiff “fear [ed] for her own safety and well-being” if
she was forced to use the men’s restroom.560 By enforcing restroom
segregation based on genitalia, cases like Johnson violate the pri-
vacy and safety of transgender persons, while also failing to add to
the privacy or safety interests of gender conforming persons.
552. See BUTLER, supra note 105, at 25 (theorizing how gender identity is constituted
through conduct).
553. See PEEING IN PEACE, supra note 59, at 3, 6–9.
554. See id. at 3 (“Safe bathroom access is not a luxury or a special right.”).
555. See Levi & Redman, supra note 14, at 163 (“The privacy objection to transgender-
inclusive laws is rooted in the idea that restricting restroom use to persons of the same
sex guarantees privacy from the sexual (or otherwise ‘improper’) gaze of others”).
556. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (“If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expres-
sion of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”).
Similarly, today we would never argue that public swimming pools should remain ra-
cially segregated over a perceived loss of privacy. See Wolff, supra note 490, at 217–20
(discussing anxiety over this loss of privacy).
557. See PEEING IN PEACE, supra note 59, at 12–13 (noting that requiring transgender
persons to use “gender neutral” restrooms or restrooms of their birth sex would require
them to “out” themselves every time they use the restroom).
558. Johnson v. Fresh Mark, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 996, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (rejecting
sex stereotyping claim under Title VII).
559. Id.
560. Id. at 998.
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Sex-segregated restrooms admittedly raise difficult questions
for my free speech theory. When trans people use sex-segregated
restrooms, the government (and private individuals) reacts to the
message of gender nonconformity. By excluding trans people from
the restrooms, the government suppresses their communication of
gender nonconformity. Nonetheless, the government may still have
legitimate interests in privacy and safety. These real interests should
be balanced against each other under a First Amendment analysis.
Here, I argue that courts should recognize how restricting trans-
gender restroom access singles out conduct because it expresses a
message of gender nonconformity. Only then can these interests be
properly balanced.
CONCLUSION
When the state regulates employee dress codes, determines child
custody, or enforces sex segregation in restrooms, it claims to have
neutral interests. But my analysis reveals how these allegedly neu-
tral interests are achieved through singling out particular conduct
because it expresses gender nonconformity. Even if a government
employer’s interest in professional appearance is independent of the
message of gender nonconformity, it cannot define professional ap-
pearance by singling out gender nonconformity. I interpret O’Brien
to prohibit singling out expressive conduct as a means of achieving
otherwise valid government interests.
Gender nonconformity is more than a mere personal style. We
use dress, appearance, and other gendered behavior to define and
express our identity. We protect free speech partially out of respect
for this key value of autonomy. When the state acts to suppress gen-
der nonconformity, it infringes on this process of self-definition.
By using specific cases, I illustrate how my theory is viable in
practice. The government does single out gender nonconformity. Right
now, courts largely fail to interrogate state interests in regulating
gender. Thus, my primary goal in this article was to establish how the
state targets specific conduct that expresses gender nonconformity.
But my discussion of specific cases also raises theoretical and
practical limits to my argument. What interests does the govern-
ment as employer have in professional appearance? How can courts
balance parental speech rights against best interests of the child?
How far do legitimate interests in privacy reach in the restroom
context? Because my central goal in this article is to reveal how
state action is based on messages of gender nonconformity, I can-
not fully address these limits. Once we recognize how the state
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suppresses communication of gender nonconformity, we can better
consider the limits of other state interests.
A free speech basis for transgender rights should be used to
complement, not replace, antidiscrimination law. I do not argue for
any single understanding of gender or the proper legal protection.
Instead, I argue that conceptualizing gender nonconformity as free
speech offers an additional legal avenue to protect gender identity,
and may be more consistent with how some people understand their
gender. This argument also speaks to broader concerns about the
relationship between appearance, identity, and autonomy.
